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HE termination of a marriage is undoubtedly a traumatic event.
Emotions are frayed by the rending of a relationship often entered
into with the promise of love "until death do us part." Difficult
emotional and practical problems also arise when agreement on the cus-
tody of children is required. The division of marital property according to
the requirements of state law, and sometimes equity, presents another
practical problem. Indeed, with the growth in numbers of childless mar-
riages and two career families, disputes over property division may well
replace custody battles as the repository for the emotional bloodletting of a
dissolving marriage. The federal income tax system imposes onto all of
this a complex array of rules fraught with traps for the unwary. Couples
with even moderate wealth require counsel knowledgeable in the intrica-
cies of federal tax law in order to avoid unexpected tax liability. Often a
division that appears equal before tax will be grossly disproportionate after
the tax assessment.
This Article explores various provisions taxing the transfer of wealth on
divorce. Although the principle focus of the Article is on the division of
property between separating spouses, some consideration is given to the
regime for splitting post-divorce earnings between the parties in the form
of alimony or support payments. The Article recommends congressional
action providing uniform national treatment for property divisions on di-
vorce with basis provisions to insure equitable after-tax division.
I. OVERVIEW
There are, in general, three categories of wealth transfer between sepa-
rating spouses. The first is the periodic transfer of post-divorce income.
The burden of income taxation falls on the recipient of support or alimony
pursuant to an approved form of income splitting. ' A second set of rules
deals with the lump sum transfer of cash or property, or the periodic trans-
fer of a fixed amount, in satisfaction of support or other marital obliga-
tions.2 In contrast with the first regime, this category does not shift the
burden of taxation to the recipient of property. The tax burden is shared
by the marital community when cash previously reported as income on a
joint return is used.3 Where appreciated property is transferred in satisfac-
tion of a marital obligation, the tax burden for pre-divorce appreciation
1. See I.R.C. §§ 7 1(a), 215 (1976).
2. Payment of an ascertainable sum is not covered by the income splitting mechanism
of§ § 71 and 215. See id. § 71(c).
3. The tax burden is shared because previously earned cash has presumably been ac-
counted for by the parties on their joint return, generating tax consequences for which both
spouses are liable. Id. § 6013(d)(3) (1976).
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falls on the transferor.4 The transferee is not taxed on the receipt of prop-
erty and receives it with a basis equal to fair market value.5 The final
category is the division of co-owned property. A division of jointly owned
property is generally not a taxable event, 6 and the recipient retains the
marital community's basis. 7 The burden of taxation for pre-divorce appre-
ciation, however, falls on the recipient of such property upon subsequent
disposition. Each of these categories will be considered as part of a search
for common principles that unify the treatment of wealth transfer on
divorce.
II. PERIODIC TRANSFER OF POST-DIVORCE INCOME: SPOUSAL
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY
In 1917 the United States Supreme Court held in Gould v. Gould8 that
alimony paid by a husband to his ex-wife was neither includible in the
wife's income nor a decrease in the gross income of the divorced husband.9
In 1942 Congress concluded that alimony payments plus the income tax on
earnings used to pay alimony could exceed the obligor's actual income.' 0
Congress sought to correct this situation by taxing alimony and separate
maintenance payments to the recipient spouse and allowing a deduction to
the payor.I The House and Senate committee reports indicate that this
provision was intended to produce uniformity in the treatment of alimony
payments regardless of differing state law and to clarify the tax conse-
quences of payments out of the net income of so-called irrevocable ali-
mony trusts.12
As originally enacted, section 22K of the Internal Revenue Code of
193913 applied only to an obligation arising out of the family or marital
relationship in recognition of a general obligation to support made specific
by an instrument or decree of divorce or separation. 14 The 1954 Code ex-
4. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 70-72 (1962).
5. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
6. Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1, aff'd per curam,
552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977); Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
7. See, e.g., Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959, 964 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 2,
afl'dper curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977), Wren v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH)
290, 294 (1965); Oliver v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 403, 430 (1949).
8. 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
9. Id. at 154. The Court described alimony as follows:
Alimony does not arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of
marriage. It is not founded on contract, express or implied, but on the natural
and legal duty of the husband to support the wife. The general obligation to
support is made specific by the decree of the court of appropriate jurisdic-
tion. . . . Permanent alimony is regarded rather as a portion of the husband's
estate to which the wife is equitably entitled, than as strictly a debt; alimony
from time to time may be regarded as a portion of his current income or
earnings; . ...
Id. at 153 (quoting Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 577-78 (1901)).
10. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 69-71; S. REP. No. 673 (pt. 1), 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1941).
13. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 120, 56 Stat. 798, 816-17.
14. S. REP. No. 673 (pt. 1), 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1941). Whether a particular obliga-
1984]
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panded the alimony rules to payments received under a written separation
agreement where husband and wife are actually separated and to pay-
ments received under a judicial decree of support or maintenance. 15 Thus
the current provision, section 71(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
taxes the recipient on periodic payments that are received in discharge of a
marital or family obligation under either a decree or written instrument
incident to divorce or separation or pursuant to a written separation agree-
ment, and payments received pursuant to a judicial decree for support or
maintenance.16 Payments included in gross income of the recipient by vir-
tue of section 71(a) are deductible by the payor under section 215.17
Under this statutory scheme a couple may freely arrange for the splitting
of income at each stage of the breakup of their marriage, as long as the
tion was imposed by a decree of divorce or separate maintenance within the meaning of the
statute has been extensively litigated. See, e.g., Hand v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH)
1125 (1972), af'd mem., 483 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir. 1973); Reisman v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.
570 (1968), acq. 1972-2 C.B. 3; Christopher v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 521 (1959).
15. I.R.C. § 71 (1976). The House report indicated that the prior provision discrimi-
nated against husbands and wives who had separated, although not under a court decree.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1954). The House bill included what is now
I.R.C. § 7 1(a)(2) (1976), which applies to support payments under a written separation
agreement. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, at 10. The Senate Finance Committee concurred and
added I.R.C. § 7 l(a)(3) (1976) providing for support payments pursuant to a judicial decree
for support or maintenance. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 170-71 (1954).
16. I.R.C. § 71(a) (1976) provides:
(1) Decree of divorce or separate maintenance
If a wife is divorced or legally separated from her husband under a decree
of divorce or of separate maintenance, the wife's gross income includes peri-
odic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received after such
decree in discharge of (or attributable to property transferred, in trust or
otherwise, in discharge of) a legal obligation which, because of the marital or
family relationship, is imposed on or incurred by the husband under the de-
cree or under a written instrument incident to such divorce or separation.
(2) Written separation agreement
If a wife is separated from her husband and there is a written separation
agreement executed after the date of the enactment of this title, the wife's gross
income includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals)
received after such agreement is executed which are made under such agree-
ment and because of the marital or family relationship (or which are attributa-
ble to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, under such agreement and
because of such relationship). This paragraph shall not apply if the husband
and wife make a single return jointly.
(3) Decree for support
If a wife is separated from her husband, the wife's gross income includes
periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received by her
after the date of the enactment of this title from her husband under a decree
entered after March 1, 1954, requiring the husband to make the payments for
her support or maintenance. This paragraph shall not apply if the husband
and wife make a single return jointly.
The terms "husband" and "wife" are used interchangeably and refer to a former husband or
wife as well. Id. § 7701(a)(17).
17. Id. § 215(a) provides:
In the case of a husband described in section 71, there shall be allowed as a
deduction amounts includible under section 71 in the gross income of his wife,
payment of which is made within the husband's taxable year. No deduction
shall be allowed under the preceding sentence with respect to any payment if,
by reason of section 71(d) or 682, the amount thereof is not includible in the
husband's gross income.
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arrangement meets the various statutory requirements.' 8 Although the
statute by its terms is mandatory, parties with adequate sophistication may
treat sections 71 and 215 as an election by meeting or failing to meet the
various statutory requirements. 19 Some commentators suggest that the
function of the various substantive requirements of sections 71 and 215 is
to distinguish periodic payments out of current earnings that deflect cur-
rent income from payments made to divide existing property interests. 20
Even if Congress did not expressly consider this analysis, it is consistent
with the economic result of the statute. As a practical matter, where a
qualifying payment 2' is made over a period of time following divorce, the
source of payment will be the payor's current income. The statutory
scheme taxes the recipient on this current income even though the income
is earned by the payor.22 Conversely, where existing property interests are
divided at divorce, there is usually no current tax burden to allocate, and
therefore no reason for an income splitting mechanism. In the latter case
the hardship avoided by sections 71 and 215 may not exist 23 since a spouse
receiving his or her own property will bear the burden of taxation only
upon disposition of that property. If this analysis of the statutory scheme
is correct, our inquiry should focus on whether the specific requirements of
the Code distinguish a settlement of property interests and a division of
future income as clearly as is possible or even desirable.
The first substantive requirement of section 71(a)(1) provides that the
obligation to pay alimony must arise under either a decree of divorce or
separate maintenance, or a written instrument incident to such divorce or
18. Certainly, complete contractual freedom to fix the tax consequences of periodic pay-
ments does not exist. Professor Sneed, now a federal circuit judge, comments:
While dogmatism in a matter of this kind is not possible, this partial contrac-
tual freedom requires that the question be asked why complete freedom
should not exist. It is at least arguable that, to the extent the marriage rela-
tionship becomes more consensual by means of removal of legal impediments
to divorce, so should the income tax consequences of the financial arrange-
ments incident to divorce. As it is, the structure is a somewhat curious blend
of status and contract-a blend, however, which is no more curious than that
reflected by the local laws of divorce.
S. SNEED, THE CONFIGURATION OF GRoss INCOME 271 (1967).
19. This "election" must be carefully planned since one party may attempt to remake
the parties' agreement either to avoid tax or obtain a deduction. See Pierce v. Commis-
sioner, 66 T.C. 840 (1976) (appeal dismissed nol. pros.), acq. 1978-1 C.B. 2; Bishop v. Com-
missioner, 55 T.C. 720 (1971). See generally Lewis, Income Tax Planning at Divorce or
Separation, 5 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 445, 454-55 (1980) (discussion of interjection of one
party's intent into ambiguous agreement); Note, Taxation of Divorce Settlement and the
Property/Support Distinction, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 950-53 (1982) (citing cases where party
successfully restructured agreement).
20. Halpert, Planningfor Shifting Taxable Income in Divorce and Separation, 37 INST.
ON FED. TAX'N § 34.02[7], at 34-14 (1979); Steines,.4 Reappraisal ofthe Taxation of Wealth
Transfers Incident to Divorce, 56 WASH. L. REv. 217, 230 (1981); Note, supra note 19, at 944.
21. The payment is qualifying if it falls within the parameters of I.R.C. § 71(a) (1976).
22. This is true whether the payment is contingent on some future event, such as death
or remarriage, which guarantees alimony treatment, see Treas. Reg. § 1.71-I (d)(3)(i)(a), or is
a fixed sum payable periodically over some future period of time.
23. See Note, supra note 19, at 943.
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separation. 24 Subdivision (a)(2) applies only where payments are made
pursuant to a written separation agreement. 25 In either case, voluntary
payments in the absence of a writing will not qualify. 26 This requirement
sensibly limits income splitting to cases where the payor's obligation is
manifested in a writing and avoids ad hoc allocations of taxable income. 27
The writing requirement is automatically satisfied in section 71(a)(3),
which applies to payments under a judicial decree of support or
maintenance. 28
The principal requirement of section 71(a) is that payments be "peri-
odic." This requirement provides one of the primary distinctions between
payments for support out of the payor's post-divorce or separation income
and a division of property that gives each spouse his or her pre-divorce
property interests. 29 Congressional reports do not expressly describe the
purpose of the periodic payment requirement, but legislative history indi-
cates that sections 71 and 215 do not tax the spouse on the receipt of prop-
24. I.R.C. § 71(a)(l) (1976). Payments pursuant to a decree of annulment also qualify
as alimony under § 71(a)(l). Newburger v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 457, 460 (1974); Reisman
v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 570, 574 (1968). In Clark v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 519 (1972),
the parties signed a letter agreement modifying the terms of the divorce decree requiring
payment of an ascertainable sum over seven years. Absent the contingency specified in the
letter, the payments could not qualify as alimony. Id. at 525. The letter agreement provided
for a reduction of payments to $50 if the wife should remarry. The agreement was not
incorporated into the divorce decree because state law required fixing a noncontingent spe-
cific sum of alimony. The Tax Court held that the letter agreement constituted a written
instrument incident to the divorce sufficient to qualify the payments as alimony. Id. at 524.
The court said that the phrase "incident to such divorce" used in § 71(a)(I) means incident
to the status of divorce rather than incident to the decree of divorce. Id. Thus the agree-
ment need not be incorporated in the divorce decree if the legal obligation of support has
continued from the time of divorce.
25. I.R.C. § 71(a)(2) (1976). It also requires an actual physical separation. Id. The Tax
Court has held that an estranged couple residing in the same abode are not separated even
though they have little contact or communication. Washington v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
601, 605 (1981); Delvecchio v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1153, 1155 (1973). The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has allowed § 71 treatment for alimony payments
even though husband and wife continue to occupy the same residence. Syndes v. Commis-
sioner, 577 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1978).
26. Glickler v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 405 (1978) (appeal dismissed nol.
pros.); Clark v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 57 (1972); Brown v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 865
(1968), afdper curiam, 415 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1969); Herrmann v. Commissioner, 23
T.C.M. (CCH) 429 (1964).
27. At least one case has held that a declaration in open court reflected in the written
transcript does not satisfy the writing requirements. Greenfield v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1576, 1578 (1978) (affidavit filed in court not sufficient evidence of written agree-
ment); see also Sheeley v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 531, 534 (1973) (oral agreement stipulated
to in court and made part of record held not to satisfy requirement of § 152(e)). But see
Prince v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1058, 1067 (1976) (oral agreement stipulated to in open
court meets writing r.quirement of § 7 1).
28. I.R.C. § 71(a)(3) (1976). Subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(3) also provide that § 71 treat-
ment does not apply when the parties file a joint return. Id. § 71(a)(2)-(3). A joint return
accomplishes the same income splitting as the alimony provisions. Including payments in
the income of one spouse with a deduction by the other on a joint return would have a net
effect of zero with respect to taxable income. A husband and wife are jointly liable for the
tax on income in a joint return regardless of which spouse earns the income. Id.
§ 6013(d)(3).
29. Halpert, supra note 20, at 34-14.
[Vol. 37
WEALTH TRANSFERS ON DIVORCE
erty interests he or she possessed before separation.30 Although the term
"periodic payments" is not defined in the Code, section 71(c)(1) provides
that periodic payments do not include installment payments in discharge
of a principal sum specified in the decree or agreement. 3 ' Thus the install-
ment payment of a fixed sum is treated as a division of property, rather
than a division of the payor's current income.32 Nonetheless, installment
payment of a principal sum is considered periodic and within the coverage
of sections 71 and 215 if the fixed sum is payable in installments over a
period of more than ten years from the date of the decree or agreement. 33
No more than ten percent of the principal sum, however, will be included
in the gross income of the recipient and deductible by the payor in any one
year.34 Presumably Congress believed that a fixed amount payable over
more than ten years was payable out of current income, while a fixed sum
payable over a shorter period represented a division of marital property.
The ten-year requirement has generated substantial litigation and creates a
trap for the unwary.35 Computational errors are common 36 and the ten-
year period may also be truncated by an error as to the date of
agreement. 37
30. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942).
31. I.R.C. § 71(c)(1) (1976). A principal sum is specified in the decree or agreement ifa
fixed amount may be ascertained from the face of the decree or agreement. An instrument
in which the total amount to be paid is stated does not differ from one in which the principal
sum must be determined by multiplying the payments by a certain period. Kent v. Commis-
sioner, 61 T.C. 133, 136 (1973); see Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(ii)(b).
32. Commissioner v. Senter, 242 F.2d 400, 403 (4th Cir. 1957).
33. I.R.C. § 71(c)(2) (1976); see also Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593, 599 (7th
Cir. 1976) (absence of contingency is not fatal to alimony status).
34. I.R.C. § 7 1(c)(2) (1976). This requirement prevents the payor from bunching de-
ductions in an earlier year and thereby imposing taxation on the recipient at a higher margi-
nal rate. The 10% limitation does not apply to delinquent installment payments for a prior
taxable year. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(2).
35. In Furrow v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1961), a divorce decree dated
July 20, 1954, ordered the husband to pay alimony of $36,000 at the rate of $300 per month,
due and payable on the first of each month. The full $36,000 was thus payable over 120
months. The first payment was due on Aug. 1, 1954, less than one month after the date of
the decree, and monthly installments were payable on the first of each month ending on July
1, 1964, a date less than 10 years after the decree. The court therefore disallowed the hus-
band's deduction for alimony payments. Id. at 607.
36. The alimony nature of an ascertainable sum payable over more than 10 years is
saved in some cases by interpretations of state law allowing payment within a grace period
following the date specified in the divorce decree or settlement agreement. See, e.g., United
States v. Reis, 214 F.2d 327, 329 (10th Cir. 1954); Tracy v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 397, 402
(1978). In Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974), the court held that a
discretionary provision allowing the husband to accelerate payment of an ascertainable sum
did not change the alimony nature of the arrangement under § 7 1(c)(2), which applies to
payments that "may be paid over more than a ten year period." Id. at 467-68 (emphasis in
onginal).
37. See Eno v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1122, 1125 (1965) (husband lost his
§ 215 deduction because his legal obligation to pay support arose, not from time of the
Nebraska district court order granting divorce and setting alimony, but from final divorce
decree after wife's appeal to state supreme court); see also Joslin v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d
1223 (7th Cir. 1970) (mere approval of property settlement agreement did not constitute
legal obligation in Nevada, absent explicit order of divorce court, and thus time period did
not reach 10 years). In Newman v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 494 (1977), a nunc pro tunc order
of the divorce court advancing the due date of the first payment allowed the parties to satisfy
19841
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An obligation stated as a principal sum will be a periodic payment,
whether payable over ten years or not, if payment is subject to the death of
either spouse, remarriage of the wife, or change in the economic status of
either spouse. 38 Such a contingent payment also escapes the ten-percent
limitation of section 71(c)(2). A principal sum cannot be fixed where a
contingency may terminate or revise the obligation.39
Finally, section 71 requires that periodic payment be made pursuant to a
legal obligation that arises "because of the marital or family relation-
ship." 40 Regulations add that "[s]ection 71(a) applies only to payments
made because of the family or marital relationship in recognition of the
general obligation to support which is made specific by the decree, instru-
ment, or agreement."'4' Like the periodic payment requirement, this provi-
sion distinguishes between payments for support, which represent a
transfer of current income, and payments in exchange for the recipient's
interest in marital property. 42
The courts generally hold that characterization of an obligation as sup-
port (alimony) or a property settlement depends upon the intent of the
parties determined from the facts and circumstances of each case.43 Use of
this "intent of the parties" test to distinguish between property settlements
and the support right" is hardly a stalwart yardstick on which to base tax
the 10-year requirement. The Tax Court found that the original decree did not reflect the
intent of the state court and the nunc pro tunc order was entered to correct a mistake in that
decree. Id. at 500.
38. See Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(i)(a), (ii). Courts generally find that these payments
are in satisfaction of an obligation to support. Salapatas v. Commissioner, 466 F.2d 79, 81-
82 (7th Cir. 1971); Suarez v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 857, 864 (1977) (appeal dismissed);
Clark v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 519, 522-23 (1963). In addition, alimony arrangements sub-
ject to modification under state law because of changed circumstances are indefinite in
amount and therefore periodic payments under § 71(a). Lounsbury v. Commissioner, 37
T.C. 163, 170 (1961), acq. 1962-1 C.B. 4, afl'don other grounds, 321 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1963).
39. See Landa v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 46, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Baker v. Commis-
sioner, 205 F.2d 369, 375 (2d Cir. 1953); Clark v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 519 (1972). The
presence or absence of a contingency is another area generating substantial litigation.
40. I.R.C. § 71(a) (1976).
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4).
42. See id. § 1.7 1-1(c)(4); Steines, supra note 20, at 225. This provision has also gener-
ated substantial litigation. See, e.g., Landa v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
Pierce v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 840 (1976) (appeal dismissed nol. pros.), acq. 1978-1 C.B. 2;
Martin v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1219 (1972); Thompson v. Commissioner, 50
T.C. 522 (1968).
43. Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1976); West v. United States,
332 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (S.D. Tex. 1971), afl'd, 477 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1973). A principal
distinction found in the case law, however, is the presence or absence of a contingency. See,
e.g., McCombs v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 4, 8 (10th Cir. 1968) (absence of contingency
suggests property settlement); Landa v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 46, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
(court cited provision in agreement terminating payment on wife's death as evidence that
support was intended); see also Commissioner v. Senter, 242 F.2d 400, 404 (4th Cir. 1957)
(payments made over less than 10 years are periodic, not installments, and terminate on
death or remarriage); Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369, 370 (2d Cir. 1953) (remarriage
contingency interpreted to prove periodic payment); Burton v. United States, 139 F. Supp.
121, 125 (D. Utah 1956) (payments need not be characterized as alimony in limited sense to
be periodic payments under statute). See generally Note, supra note 19.
44. Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1976); Phinney v. Mauk, 411
F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir. 1969); West v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (S.D. Tex.
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planning.45 The test is particularly troublesome because both parties may
agree to an ambiguous arrangement and subsequently take inconsistent
positions with respect to their initial intent.46 The courts have generally
relied on such factors as the extent of a spouse's property interest under
state law, 47 the extent to which higher periodic payments were negotiated
in exchange for an interest in property,48 evidence of a correlation between
the amount of the installment payments and a spouse's interest in prop-
erty,49 and whether support is provided for with some other form of pay-
mgJt.50 Regardless of these factors, payments extending over a substantial
period must come from the current income of the payor. As a conse-
quence, the hardship sought to be avoided by the statutory scheme, taxa-
tion of the payor on payments made to an ex-spouse, exists whether
payment is in exchange for the recipient's interest in marital property, or in
satisfaction of the recipient's right to support. Because of the potential for
reclassifying payment of a principal sum as a property division, a degree of
uncertainty surrounds any such arrangement.5'
The statutory goal of taxing the recipient on recurring payment of cur-
1971), aff'd, 477 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1973); Suarez v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 857, 861 (1977);
Prince v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1058, 1063 (1976).
45. This distinction between alimony and a property division is particularly unclear in a
common law jurisdiction. In making equitable provision for a spouse courts often ignore the
alimony-property distinction. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 451 (1968). As a practical matter the support right may be characterized as
a property interest in both the husband's current assets and a future interest in the husband's
prospective income and assets. The financial satisfaction of the wife's rights must come from
one of these sources.
46. See, e.g., Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976).
47. Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 1960).
48. McCombs v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 4, 8 (10th Cir. 1968); Bishop v. Commis-
sioner, 55 T.C. 720, 725-28 (1971); Presbrey v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 379, 382
(1970).
49. Porter v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 670, 671 (6th Cir. 1968); Schottenstein v. Com-
missioner, 75 T.C. 451, 461-62 (1980), acq. 1981-2 C.B. 2.
50. Pierce v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 840 (1976) (appeal dismissed nol. pros.), acq. 1978-
1 C.B. 2; Thompson v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 522 (1968).
51. Recurring payment of a principal sum may be classified as a property settlement
rather than alimony. An outright transfer of property may, however, be structured as ali-
mony. I.R.C. § 71(a)(l)-(3) (1976) taxes the recipient on income from property transferred
in trust or otherwise as long as the payments are periodic, in satisfaction of the payor's
familial or marital obligations, and arise out of a decree of divorce or separation, a written
separation agreement, or a judicial support order. Section 71(d) provides that the payor's
gross income does not include amounts attributable to transferred property that are included
in the gross income of the recipient under § 71(a). Id. § 71(d). No corresponding deduction
is allowed to the payor under § 215. Id. § 215(a).
Section 682 similarly provides that the recipient's gross income includes any amount dis-
tributed to her from a trust when she is divorced, legally separated, or receiving payment
under a written separation agreement and the income would otherwise be includible in the
gross income of the recipient's former spouse. Id. § 682. Section 682 is essentially the same
as the trust provisions of § 7 1(a) except that a § 682 trust is created prior to divorce and not
in contemplation thereof. Section 682 would include any grantor trust where income is
diverted in satisfaction of a spouse's marital obligation. One significant difference exists,
however. Section 71 includes all payments in the recipient's income. Section 682 includes
only payments that would be income to the grantor. Thus under § 71 the wife is taxable on
distributions of corpus while § 682 includes only trust income. See C. MARKEY, JR., CALI-
FORNIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ch. 27, at 27-33 (1983).
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rent income can be achieved with a simpler system. Congress could face
the election squarely by requiring parties to designate in the decree or by
agreement that post-divorce payments to a spouse will be taxed to the re-
cipient under section 71.52 This election would include payments out of
current earnings, or from funds generated on sale of the payor's property.
As under current law,53 payments that are contingent on remarriage, death
of a spouse, or a change in economic circumstance would be taxed to the
recipient and deducted by the payor in all circumstances. Installment pay-
ment of a principal sum would be treated as payment in exchange for an
interest in property unless both parties affirmatively elect to treat the pay-
ment as alimony subject to sections 71 and 215. 54 Such an election elimi-
nates post-divorce tax litigation regarding the intended nature of
installment payments. This proposal requires separating spouses to ad-
dress the issue directly in their negotiations and agree to a binding resolu-
tion.55  If payment in exchange for an existing property interest is
intended, the absence of an election would provide appropriate treatment.
The Code already provides for such an election with respect to child
support. Section 71(b) provides that section 71(a) will not apply to pay-
ments fixed in the decree or agreement for child support. 56 In Commis-
sioner v. Lester57 the Supreme Court held that section 71(b) was not
applicable except where payments are specifically designated for child sup-
52. See S. SNEED, supra note 18, at 292. The Tax Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion has recommended that parties to a divorce be allowed to specify in the decree or other
instrument that any portion of a principal sum or the installment payments is for the
purchase of property rights. Any portion of the principal sum or installment payments not
so designated would be taxed to the recipient as alimony for purposes of § 71(a). 19 BULL.
A.B.A. SEC. TAx. No. 4, at 62-63 (1966).
The Tax Reform Act of 1983, H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), proposed by Repre-
sentatives Rostenkowski and Conable, would define alimony includible in the gross income
of the recipient spouse under § 71 to include any payment of cash that is not designated in
the divorce or separation instrument as a payment not includible in gross income. The pro-
vision would thus provide an election out of § 71 treatment with appropriate language in the
decree or agreement. To constitute alimony, liability for the payment could not extend be-
yond the death of the recipient spouse and the payment must be one of a series of payments
where it is reasonable to expect that at least 50% of the amount payable will be paid more
than one year after the date on which the first payment is made. Id. § 423.
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(i).
54. The installment payment of a principal sum would be identified under the standards
of the current statute; a principal sum is stated in the decree or agreement where it is either
set forth expressly or can be calculated from the face of the decree or instrument. Treas.
Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(ii)(b).
55. There is a transactional cost to the parties in negotiating a settlement agreement or
in resolving the question of the election as part of a contested property division. Imposing
this cost on the individuals at the time of divorce is less expensive overall than the cost to
both the parties and the government of resolution through litigation.
56. I.R.C. § 71(b) (1976) provides:
Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part of any payment which the terms
of the decree, instrument, or agreement fix, in terms of an amount of money or
a part of the payment, as a sum which is payable for the support of minor
children of the husband. For purposes of the preceding sentence, if any pay-
ment is less than the amount specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement,
then so much of such payment as does not exceed the sum payable for support
shall be considered a payment for such support.
57. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
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port.58 Thus section 71(b) provides a specific option out of sections 71 and
215. This option is tantamount to an election made in a separation or
property settlement agreement or imposed by judicial decree. There is no
substantial reason why a similar election with respect to alimony or sup-
port in general should not be allowed.
III. LUMP SUM TRANSFERS IN SATISFACTION OF SUPPORT OR OTHER
MARITAL RIGHTS
In stark contrast to the regime created by sections 71 and 215, wealth
transfers in exchange for marital rights not qualified as periodic alimony
are received tax free. 59 The tax burden of these transfers may fall equally
on each spouse60 or solely on the payor.6 1 The tax free receipt of property
in exchange for a release of marital rights by the wife originated in Gould v.
Gould.62 That case describes permanent alimony as a portion of the hus-
band's estate to which the wife is equitably entitled.63 The Supreme Court
extended the idea in United States v. Davis64 by implicitly approving the
administrative practice of allowing tax free receipt of a lump sum payment
of appreciated property in exchange for the wife's release of her inchoate
marital rights.65 The Internal Revenue Service, following the Davis rule,
stated that marital rights given by the wife in exchange for property are
equal in value to the property received. 66 Without advancing any theoreti-
cal explanation the Service concluded that there is no gain or loss to the
wife on the exchange and her basis in any property received is equal to its
fair market value.67 The courts have also been slow in explaining this the-
ory, but commentators have forwarded differing ideas.
One view holds that the wife's economic gain is a payment for status, 68
and such gains are not generally taxed as income.69 A slightly more tech-
58. Id. at 306.
59. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
60. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
61. Where payment of a principal sum is not qualified as alimony under § 71 and § 215,
the future earnings used to satisfy the obligation are taxed to the payor. Gould v. Gould,
245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917). When appreciated property is transferred in exchange for the
transferee's release of marital rights, the transferor is taxable on appreciation occurring prior
to the transfer, measured by the difference between fair market value and adjusted basis at
the time of transfer. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 70-71 (1962).
62. 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
63. Id. at 154; see supra note 9.
64. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
65. Id. at 73-74 & n.7.
66. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
67. Id.
68. S. SNEED, supra note 18, at 265; Barton, Tax Aspects of Divorce and Property Settle-
ment Agreements-The Davis, Gilmore and Patrick Cases, 16 S. CAL. TAX INST. 421, 438
(1964); Note, Property Transfer Pursuant to Divorce-Taxable Events?, 17 STAN. L. REV.
478, 481 (1965).
69. S. SNEED, supra note 18, at 107-08; see 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL &
H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 139-42 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION]. Under this analysis, a wife's status entitles her to support and the maintenance
of a standard of living commensurate with her husband's station in life. The economic value
of these benefits is not subject to taxation while the relationship continues, nor are the wife's
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nical analysis asserts that the wife's basis in her marital rights is equal to
the fair market value of those rights.70 Basis is created because the wife's
marital rights, representing an interest in her husband's property, are re-
ceived in the form of nontaxable compensation for her status as wife
and/or for the services she renders as part of that position.
A related approach suggests that the wife does not realize any economic
gain on the transaction. In a sense, what the wife receives is the equivalent
of the current value of her future support rights plus whatever additional
interest she possesses in her husband's property. In other words, the wife
gives sufficient consideration for the transfer of property.71 The cash or
fair market value of other property received by the wife is deemed to equal
the value of the rights she gives up.7 2 This results in no economic gain
taxable as income to her.73
Whatever the theoretical justification, the result seems correct from a
policy perspective. Certainly the wife enjoys no overall economic gain on
the release of marital rights for cash or property. As the Court indicated in
Gould, the wife really only receives the interest in her husband's estate to
which she is equitably entitled.74 The tax system recognizes that she
merely severs that which she already owns from the husband's estate. Sec-
tion 71 may be applicable, however, since a spouse who accepts periodic
payment, or a fixed sum payable over more than ten years in satisfaction of
marital rights, bears the full tax burden on those payments.75 Alterna-
tively, a lump sum transfer of cash has the effect of dividing the tax burden
between payor and recipient, at least where the obligation is satisfied with
cash existing in the marital community at the time of divorce. 76 On the
other hand, where support or other marital obligations are satisfied with
the installment payment of the principal sum over a period of ten years or
marital rights marketable in the sense that she could realize an economic benefit on disposi-
tion. Since these economic benefits are not taxable during marriage, cash or property re-
ceived by the wife in exchange for these benefits is likewise not subject to income taxation.
The payment is, instead, a nontaxable receipt of property as compensation for loss of status.
70. The value of this nontaxable income is the wife's cost for the rights she attains by
virtue of marital status. This cost is her basis in those marital rights, the value of which
always equals cost. See Barton, supra note 68, at 438. The realization of cash or other
property in exchange for those rights is offset by the wife's basis, resulting in no taxable gain.
I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1976).
71. Glickfield, Rabow & Schwartz, Federal income Tax Consequences of Marital Prop-
erty Settlements, 26 S. CAL. TAx INST. 307, 310-11 (1974).
72. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962).
73. The approach of the Court in Gould is similar. The Court found that alimony is not
income to the wife but rather her share "of the husband's estate to which the wife is equita-
bly entitled." 245 U.S. at 153. The wife receives property from the husband representing
only that to which she is already entitled. This view of the wife's rights, however, is incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's later conclusion in Davis that the wife has no property
interest in the husband's estate that even remotely reaches the dignity of co-ownership. 370
U.S. at 70.
74. 245 U.S. at 153.
75. I.R.C. § 71(a) (1976).
76. This assumes that the married couple filed a joint return. Cash in the hands of the
marital community probably would have been accounted for on that joint return and the tax
paid by the marital community. See id. § 6013(d)(3); supra note 3.
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less, the burden of taxation falls upon the payor.77
The payor also bears the tax burden where appreciated property is used
to satisfy a marital obligation. The United States Supreme Court held in
Davis that the transfer of appreciated stock in exchange for a wife's release
of her inchoate marital rights is a taxable event. 78 Notwithstanding its ear-
lier description of alimony as "a portion of the husband's estate to which
the wife is equitably entitled," 79 the Davis Court concluded that the wife's
inchoate marital rights under Delaware law placed a burden only on the
husband's property rather than creating a co-ownership interest. 80 The
wife's marital rights represented a personal liability of the husband, which
he satisfied with a transfer of appreciated property.8' The amount realized
by the husband on this transfer equalled the fair market value of the prop-
erty received by the wife. The husband realized his wife's release of her
claim against him, her marital rights.82 The Davis opinion concluded that
the fair market value of these marital rights was equivalent to the value
given up in exchange for them.83 Thus, the fair market value of the stock
transferred to the wife measured the husband's amount realized on the
exchange of that stock. The effect is to tax the transferror husband on pre-
transfer appreciation, while the wife receives the property without tax84
and with a basis equal to fair market value.85
The regime resulting from Davis suffers from the same difficulty that
Congress sought to prevent with sections 71 and 215.86 As with alimony
payments under Gould, the transferee wife receives the property tax free. 87
Since her basis is stepped up to a fair market value,88 she suffers no tax
burden on the receipt of that value or on disposition. The transferror,
however, not only loses the property, but receives nothing of marketable
value in exchange, and is additionally burdened with a tax on apprecia-
tion. An example of the hardship caused by this regime is easily con-
structed. As part of a divorce settlement, a couple often agrees that their
only major asset, the appreciated family residence, is to be transferred to
the wife in partial or full satisfaction of her claims against the husband.
77. The payor will, in most cases, satisfy his obligation out of current income on which
tax is paid. The payor does not obtain a deduction under § 215 where the alimony payments
are not taxable to the recipient.
78. 370 U.S. at 70.
79. Gould, 245 U.S. at 153.
80. 370 U.S. at 70.
81. Id. at 70, 72.
82. Id. at 72.
83. Id. This conclusion was based on the Court's view that the property division was
the result of arm's length bargaining. Id. This notion is soundly criticized in Stern & Sell-
ers, Property Settlements Upon Divorce: Yours, Mine, and the Commissioner's, 48 UMKC L.
REv. 293, 319-22 (1980).
84. 370 U.S. at 73 n.7; Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
85. 370 U.S. at 73.
86. See supra notes 10-57 and accompanying text; see also Deutsch, New Approach to
the Transfer ofAppreciated Property Pursuant to Divorce, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 616, 632
(1976) (supporting revision of state statutes governing jointly acquired property).
87. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
88. Davis, 370 U.S. at 73.
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Under Davis the husband in this situation is taxed on the appreciation in
the residence, but may not have an immediate source of cash with which to
pay the tax.89 The husband might escape recognition of gain under section
1034, but only if he has the resources to purchase a new principal residence
within two years. 90 The wife receives the residence tax free with a stepped-
up basis.
In spite of its differing tax treatment, the Davis exchange is similar to
periodic payments. In the exchange of appreciated property for marital
rights there is a transfer of economic benefit that has not been subject to
taxation prior to the transfer. In the case of alimony a transfer of periodic
payments occurs out of current earnings that have not been taxed to the
ansferor. In the latter case, however, the parties are allowed to transfer
e tax cost of the economic benefit to the recipient, 9' while in the former
the tax burden falls on the transferor. 92 One possible policy justification
for this disparate treatment is that in the case of periodic payments, the
taxable economic accretion arises from post-divorce earnings of the trans-
feror rather than pre-divorce appreciation on the transferred property.
This distinction is an empty one, however, since in both cases the recipient
spouse receives the economic benefit of the untaxed gain. Equity suggests
that the marital community, composed of both husband and wife equally,
should share the tax burden of appreciation occurring during marriage.
Alternatively, the tax burden may fall on the recipient at the time he or she
realizes the economic benefit from disposition of property received in ex-
change for marital rights.93
The approach taken in Davis has no policy justification. The opinion
reaches the inequitable result prevented by sections 71 and 215 andi m
poses the tax burden of appreciation on the party who loses the property. 94
As long as the Treasury Department can tax the economic gain inherent in
appreciated property in the year the gain is realized by conversion into
money or other property,95 the type of income splitting provided by sec-
tions 71 and 215 should be available on a transfer of appreciated property
in satisfaction of marital rights. Under section 71 the recipient of periodic
payments is taxed on such income in the year it is received. The same
89. See Alcott, Selected Tax Problems in Matrimonial Disputes and Settlements, 37 INST.
ON FED. TAX'N § 33.04[1], at 33-10 (1979); DuCanto, Federal Tax Law. Where You Divorce
Does Make a Difference, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 397, 399-400 (1978).
90. I.R.C. § 1034(a) (Supp. V 1981) provides that no gain will be recognized on disposi-
tion of the taxpayer's principal residence as long as the taxpayer purchases and uses a new
residence within a period beginning two years before the date of sale of the old residence
and ending two years after the date of sale. Gain is recognized to the extent that the "ad-
justed sales price" of the old residence exceeds the cost of purchasing the new residence. Id.
91. Id. §§ 71, 215 (1976).
92. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
93. This treatment is similar to that under § 71.
94. Deutsch, supra note 86; DuCanto, supra note 89; Stern & Sellers, supra note 83, at
318.
95. Gain or loss will be taxed on final disposition of the property by the recipient spouse
as long as appropriate basis provisions are adopted to defer the realization and recognition
of gain or loss until such disposition. See infra note 307 and accompanying text.
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policy would be served by deferring recognition of gain on appreciated
property exchanged for marital rights until the year the property is con-
verted into cash or other property by the recipient, rather than taxing the
transferor at the time of divorce.
Sections 71 and 215 allow parties to a divorce to negotiate the tax impact
of their arrangement with respect to periodic payments. The tax cost of a
transfer of property in lieu of periodic payments should also be negotiable.
Tax neutrality and equity might be better served by allowing the parties to
a divorce to allocate their tax burden with respect to transfers of appreci-
ated property along with the property itself as they may with respect to
periodic payments. The Code could allow the parties flexibility either to
divide the tax cost of appreciation between the parties or, alternatively, to
shift the tax cost to the party who ultimately enjoys the economic benefit of
the property.
IV. DIVIsIONs OF PROPERTY HELD IN A FORM OF JOINT OWNERSHIP
No tax is imposed in the third category of wealth transfer at divorce.
The division of co-owned property is not considered a taxable event. The
burden of taxation for pre-divorce appreciation generally falls on the per-
son retaining the property.96 Unfortunately, identifying co-owned marital
property is not always an easy task. In Davis the taxpayer argued that his
marital settlement was a nontaxable division of jointly owned property.
The Court rejected the argument, concluding that under Delaware law the
wife's inchoate rights in her husband's property "do not even remotely
reach the dignity of co-ownership. ' 97 The Court did, however, give im-
plied approval to the longstanding administrative rule that a division of
co-owned property on divorce is not a taxable event.98 Although some
uncertainty about this principle remained immediately following Davis,
the controversy was settled when the Internal Revenue Service accepted
the principle that co-owned property may be divided on divorce without
current taxation, but added that an unequal division of co-owned property
is taxable in part.99 The Service ruled that property is co-owned where
(1) title is taken jointly under state property law, (2) the state is a commu-
nity property law state, or (3) state property law is found to be similar to
community property law, creating a species of common ownership.1°°
Co-ownership is clear only in the eight community property states ex-
pressly identified by state law. 10' In these states each spouse is considered
96. Under current law the recipient of property in a nontaxable division of co-owned
marital property retains the marital community, or co-owners', basis in the property. Car-
rieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959, 964 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1, aftdper curiam, 552
F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977).
97. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 70 (1962).
98. Id. at 69.
99. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26. For a detailed discussion of the ruling, see infra
notes 252-62 and accompanying text.
100. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26, 27.
101. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-211 to -217 (1976); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5100-5128
(West 1983); IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (Supp. 1983); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801 (West
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to own either one-half of each asset or an undivided one-half interest in
the whole.102 Co-ownership in the other two categories is not so easily as-
certained. Neither joint title under state property law, nor even sole title in
the name of the recipient spouse, guarantees shelter from gain under Da-
vis. 10 3 The third category of co-ownership, property held in a species of
common ownership, is the most difficult in terms of qualification. Al-
though several state property schemes seem to bear sufficient similarity to
common ownership to qualify under this classification, 10 4 only three, the
laws of Florida, Colorado, and Oklahoma have been so recognized.10 5
1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 123.220-.250 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. 1953, §§ 40-3-2 to -17
(1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.01-.87 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 26.16.030-.050 (Supp. 1983-1984). Of course, the parties in any of these
jurisdictions may dispute the title to a specific asset as community property versus a sole
ownership interest in one spouse.
102. The nature of an individual spouse's ownership interest is unclear. In California,
for example, a spouse is considered to own a one-half interest in each asset for purposes of
probate and death-time dispositions, see Gantner v. Johnson, 274 Cal. App. 2d 869, 876, 79
Cal. Rptr. 381, 386 (1969), while the aggregate theory treating each spouse as owning an
undivided one-half interest in the whole is used in divorce cases, see Phillipson v. Board of
Admin., 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 772-73 (1970). The nature of a spouse's interest in the
other community property states also varies. See generally W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 444-45, 464-65 (1975).
103. The Service has ruled that an equal division of jointly owned property will not be
treated as a taxable event. Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158, 159. The existence of joint
title, however, does not guarantee tax-free treatment. In Forbes v. United States, 472 F.
Supp. 840 (D. Mass. 1979), the district court held that property held by a Massachusetts
couple as tenants in the entirety was not co-owned property. Id. at 842. The court found
that the wife's interest was no greater than the inchoate interest of the wife in Davis. Id.
Similarly, sole title in the recipient prior to divorce does not always free the other spouse
from taxation under Davis. In Swaim v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 302 (1968), ar'd, 417 F.2d
353 (6th Cir. 1969), the Tax Court held that disposition of an installment note as part of a
divorce settlement was taxable to the husband under I.R.C. § 453(d) (current version at
§ 453B (Supp. V 1981)), notwithstanding the fact that title to the note was solely in the wife's
name prior to divorce. 50 T.C. at 305. The note was received on the sale of property held
by husband and wife as joint tenants. They had each taken separate notes for their individ-
ual share of the sales proceeds. In the state divorce proceeding the trial court held under
state law that since the notes originated in property acquired with the husband's funds, the
wife was required to restore the note to him. Ultimately, however, the trial court allowed
the wife to keep the note. The Tax Court concluded that the note had been transferred to
the wife in a transaction taxable under Davis. Id.; see also Cook v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.
512 (1983). In Cook the husband was allowed to return appreciated property to his wife
without tax. The husband had obtained the property in a completed gift from his wife. Title
was in the husband alone. The Tax Court relied in large part upon the testimony of the state
divorce referee that he ordered the husband to return the stock and other property because
there was "more or less a quasi-ownership in [the wife]" and the property was considered a
part of the wife's family estate. 80 T.C. at 527. The Tax Court thus concluded that the stock
transfer was not a taxable division of property. Id. at 528.
104. Commentators have identified several state provisions, which if properly interpreted
by state courts, could give rise to the "species of common ownership" described in Rev. Rul.
74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26. See Sterns & Sellers, supra note 83, at 302 n.50; Note, Should Fed-
eral Income Tax Consequences of Divorce Depend on Slate Properly Law?, 49 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1401, 1419-23 (1976).
105. See Bosch v. United States, 590 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1979) (Florida), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1044 (1980); Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975) (Colorado); Collins v.
Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969) (Oklahoma).
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A. Examination of the Species of Common Ownership
Consideration of the species of common ownership begins with Pulliam
v. Commissioner,'°6 where the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
voluntary transfer of appreciated property in a Colorado divorce gener-
ated taxable gain to the husband under Davis107 The Colorado statute
permitted the divorce court to make reasonable provision for payment of
alimony and maintenance of the wife, and directed the divorce court to
decree a division of property. In dividing property the divorce court con-
sidered such factors as the couple's financial condition, the husband's duty
of support, the extent of property brought into the marriage by the wife,
and the husband's earning capacity. The husband attempted to distinguish
Davis, which was based on voluntary transfer, from the court-ordered
transfer imposed in Puliam. The court held that under Colorado law the
husband had a duty to make provision for his wife's support, and noted
that the wife's rights during marriage did not vest in any ownership in the
husband's property.'08 The court thus upheld the Commissioner's asser-
tion that the transfer of appreciated property to the wife was a taxable
event. 109
In Collins v. Commissioner" ° the Tenth Circuit followed its Pulliam
holding to conclude that under Oklahoma law a wife's rights do not in-
dude a vested interest in marital property sufficient to avoid recognition of
gain to the husband under Davis. I ' Like the Colorado statute in Pulliam,
the Oklahoma statute required the divorce court to divide property ac-
quired by the parties jointly during marriage in a just and reasonable man-
ner. 1 2 The Collinses had entered into a voluntary property settlement
that was approved by the Oklahoma divorce court. The taxpayer argued
that under Oklahoma law his wife had a vested interest in their marital
property and that the division was therefore a nontaxable division of co-
owned property. The Tenth Circuit surveyed Oklahoma case law holding
that jointly acquired property is regarded as held in a species of common
ownership.' ' 3 The state decisions also established that marital property
was to be divided independent of provisions for alimony and that an
Oklahoma divorce court should consider the manner in which the property
was acquired and the actions of both parties in accumulating and retaining
the estate. The court of appeals noted, however, that the Oklahoma courts
had held that one spouse holds no specific vested interest in any specific
property owned by the other spouse." 4
106. 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836 (1964).
107. 329 F.2d at 99.
108. Id. at 97.
109. Id. at 99.
110. 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 215 (1968), rev'd, 412 F.2d
211 (10th Cir. 1969).
111. 388 F.2d at 355.
112. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West 1961) (current version at OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1278 (West Supp. 1982-1983)); 388 F.2d at 354 n.2.
113. 388 F.2d at 355-56.
114. Id. at 356-57.
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The Tenth Circuit compared the Oklahoma statute with the Colorado
provision considered in Pulliam and found that the Colorado statute, like
the Oklahoma provision, considered the property division separate from
alimony and that both were awarded on the theory that the wife should
have a share of the property upon divorce. 15 The court concluded that
there was no distinction between the two state provisions to justify a differ-
ent result." 16 The Oklahoma statute therefore did not include traditional
rights of ownership, and the division was taxable under Davis." 17
Subsequent to the Tenth Circuit's initial Collins decision, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that the property division in Collins was not taxable
under the state tax code." 8 The Oklahoma court interpreted the state stat-
ute as giving the wife an interest similar in concept to community property.
The property therefore was held in a species of common ownership.'1 9
Following this decision, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Collins and remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit for considera-
tion in light of the state supreme court decision. 120 On remand the Tenth
Circuit reiterated its statement that the question of co-ownership under
Davis depends upon state law and held that the highest state court's inter-
pretation of the marital property interest controlled in this setting.' 2' The
Tenth Circuit, reversing its initial decision, concluded that the transfer was
a nontaxable division of property between co-owners and rejected the
Commissioner's argument that Davis creates a federal standard for co-
ownership. 122
In Wiles v. Commissioner 23 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a Kansas statute did not create a co-ownership interest similar to the
Oklahoma provision. 24 In Wiles the taxpayers had negotiated a property
settlement agreement under which neither spouse claimed alimony, and
which provided for an equal division of property. The husband and wife
in Wiles managed to create a fair and equitable property division, which
the Commissioner disrupted by imposing the tax burden of the division on
the husband. Like the Oklahoma provision, the Kansas statute requires
the divorce court to marshal all of the couple's property, regardless of own-
ership or acquisition, and divide it in a just and reasonable manner. 25
The divorce court is further directed to consider the source of the property,
the contribution of the parties, their earning capacity, fault, needs, ages,
115. Id. at 357.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
119. Id. at 295.
120. 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
121. Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211, 212 (10th Cir. 1969).
122. Id. at 212.
123. 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
124. 499 F.2d at 259. In the initial Collins opinion the court noted that the Oklahoma
and Kansas statutes were similar. 388 F.2d at 353 n.9. The similarities did not, however,
lead to a similar tax treatment.
125. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (1973) (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610
(Supp. 1982)).
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and length of marriage. As in Oklahoma and Colorado, the wife's prop-
erty interest is independent of any right to alimony or support. 126 In ap-
plying the Kansas statute, the Tax Court had noted that the Kansas
Supreme Court compared the Kansas marital relationship to a partner-
ship, the termination of which was to be accompanied by a property divi-
sion regardless of fault.127 The Tax Court also found, however, that the
Kansas statute could operate to divest a husband of his separate property,
and further, that nearly all of the securities transferred to the wife in the
property settlement had been brought into the marriage by the husband. 128
The Tax Court held that, absent a clear state court decision as in Collins, it
was required to follow its first decision in Collins129 treating the property
division as a taxable event.' 30
On appeal the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Kansas wife's right to a
just and equitable share of the marital property was not a co-ownership
interest.' 3 ' The court noted that the wife's interest in her husband's prop-
erty vested only upon the husband's death, and then only if the wife sur-
vived.132 The Tenth Circuit also recognized that the wife may expect to
receive a share of her husband's property on divorce. 133 It pointed out,
however, that the property division was within the discretion of the trial
court, and opined that the trial court's consideration of the source of the
property, the parties' contributions, earning capacity, and fault, as well as
other factors required by state law, was inconsistent with the idea of co-
owned property. 134 "If the wife were a co-owner in Kansas, her interest in
the property to be divided would be based on more than a right to a 'just
and equitable' share therein."' 35 Notwithstanding its second Collins deci-
sion,' 36 the Tenth Circuit apparently believes that co-ownership requires a
definite interest vested in the wife during marriage. An interest that vests
only on the filing of a divorce action is not sufficient. 137 The property
interest of an Oklahoma wife was modeled on the Kansas statute and is
not materially different from the Kansas interest described by the court in
Wiles.' 38 The Tenth Circuit also noted the United States District Court
126. 499 F.2d at 257.
127. 60 T.C. 56, 61(1973), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 4, af'd, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 996 (1974).
128. 60 T.C. at 63.
129. Collins v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 461 (1966), afI'd, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir.), vacated
and remanded, 393 U.S. 215 (1968), rev'd, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
130. 60 T.C. at 63.
131. 499 F.2d at 258.
132. Id. at 257.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 257-58.
135. Id. at 258.
136. Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
137. This is the reasoning adopted by the Tenth Circuit in its initial Collins decision. See
388 F.2d at 356-57.
138. The Oklahoma wife had no vested interest prior to divorce and the division of prop-
erty was subject to an exercise of the trial court's discretion. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1968); see Cady v. Cady, 224 Kan. 339, 581 P.2d 358, 363
(1978) (holding that Kansas statute creates species of common ownership in accord with
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decision in Imel v. United States,139 where on certification the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the Colorado statute' 4° recognized a species of
common ownership of the marital estate by the wife resembling a division
of property between co-owners.1 4 1 The Wiles court rejected both the Colo-
rado and Oklahoma decisions, saying "[tihey are noted in recognition of
the disparities which exist in the application of federal tax statutes to trans-
actions occurring in the states which compose the Tenth Circuit."'142
Soon after Mriles the Tenth Circuit reexamined the Colorado statute. In
Haywtin v. Commissioner 43 the court followed Pulliam and concluded that
Colorado law did not create a co-ownership interest in the wife in spite of
the Colorado Supreme Court's holding otherwise in its interpretation of
the statute in connection with lIrel. The Hayutin court considered
whether periodic payments to the wife were in satisfaction of a marital
obligation of the husband and therefore taxable to the wife under section
71, or, as asserted by the wife, a nontaxable property settlement. The court
decided the question against the wife, concluding that under Colorado law
the wife had no vested interest in the husband's property. The payments
could not, therefore, have been a property settlement.44 The Tenth Cir-
cuit stated that the Colorado husband's property is basically free from any
vested interest of the wife, except for her inchoate rights, which vest upon
the filing of the divorce action.' 45 These rights, said the court, are contin-
gent upon divorce, are in an undetermined amount of property, and are
analogous to those of a wife who can establish a resulting trust. 46 The
rights could not be exercised by the wife during marriage. The court also
pointed out that the statute directing a just and equitable division of the
marital property was discretionary with the trial court. 47 Echoing the lan-
guage of its opinions in the first Collins decision and Wiles, the Tenth Cir-
cuit concluded that "[tlhese factors are inconsistent with the idea of co-
owned property. A co-owner's rights in property to be divided would de-
pend not upon marital factors and their right to a 'just', 'equitable', or 'fair'
share . . . .but would depend upon actual ownership rights."' 48 The
court thus found that "although the payments in question might be charac-
terized by Colorado courts as a property settlement they are in fact pay-
cases decided by Oklahoma courts). For a comparison of the Oklahoma and Kansas stat-
utes, see Graham, Taxation on Transfer of CapitalAssets at Divorce-A Proposalfor Reform,
19 WILLAMET'rE L.J. 229, 242-43 (1983). The Tenth Circuit described its second Collins
decision and the Oklahoma statute as "troublesome," but indicated that the Oklahoma law
was in a state of flux. Wiles, 499 F.2d at 258.
139. 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974), af'd, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975).
140. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 46-1-5, -13 (1963) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-
10-105, -113 (1973 & Supp. 1982)).
141. In re Questions Submitted by United States Dist. Court for Dist. of Colo., 517 P.2d
1331 (Colo. 1974).
142. 499 F.2d at 259.
143. 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1975).
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ments in satisfaction of a marital obligation and not part of a division of
marital property."' 49
Notwithstanding the fine distinctions between the second Collins deci-
sion and Wiles that were drawn in Hayutin, the Tenth Circuit changed its
view when faced with the Irel case itself. 150 As in its second Collins opin-
ion, the Tenth Circuit rejected the government's argument that Davis es-
tablished a federal standard as to the nature of the wife's pretransfer rights
in marital property.' 5 ' In addition the court stated that Davis did not de-
fine the time at which the interest of the wife had to vest.' 52 Finally, the
court noted that both the Oklahoma and Colorado state courts had held
that vesting occurred at the time of the filing of the divorce suit.' 53 This
latter comment undermines the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in both Wiles
and Hayut'in, where it focused on the absence of a vested property interest
during marriage. 15 4
The Imel decision undercuts a second major premise of Wiles. The
Tenth Circuit had indicated in Wiles that state law allowing a discretion-
ary property division by the trial court based on various factors such as the
contribution of each party and fault was inconsistent with the idea of co-
owned property. 55 The Colorado statute at issue in Imel directed the trial
court to divide marital property "in such proportions as may be fair and
equitable."1 56 The Colorado statute required consideration of factors sim-
149. Id. One commentator has observed:
The error in the Hayulin court's application of Davis to the prop-
erty/support distinction is that it equates co-ownership of property with a
marital right in that property. The issue in a property/support determination
is not whether the property is co-owned, but whether the payments are made
in consideration for the relinquishment of some right in currently held prop-
erty as opposed to a right to a future income stream.
Note, supra note 19, at 949. A marital right to property may be tantamount to an ownership
interest in property. In Bosch v. United States, 590 F.2d 165 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1044 (1980), holding that a Florida wife's "special equity" is a property interest subject to
tax free division between co-owners, the court accepted the parties' agreement that "the
question whether this decree was a division of property interests between the parties or was
an award in lieu of alimony is to be resolved by reference to state law." 590 F.2d at 167.
150. Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975). The Colorado Supreme Court,
has stated that a Colorado wife has a species of common ownership. In re Questions Sub-
mitted by United States Dist. Court for Dist. of Colo., 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974).
151. 523 F.2d at 856.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Although the Tenth Circuit did not expressly say in Wiles that the wife's interest
under Kansas law vested upon filing the divorce action, the court's opinion is based in part
upon its conclusion that the wife had no vested interest in property during marriage. The
court said:
Just as the wife's inchoate rights vest upon her husband's death, the filing of
a divorce suit confers additional rights on the wife. The state divorce laws
compel the courts to marshal all of the parties' property, regardless of owner-
ship or acquisition, and to divide it in a just and reasonable manner.
499 F.2d at 257. The court added that "[t]he Davis test depends on the transferee's rights in
the property during marriage." Id. at 258.
155. Id. at 257-58.
156. 375 F. Supp. at 1113 (quoting COLO REV. STAT. § 46-1-5 (1963)). The current ver-
sion of the Colorado statute is at COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-105 (Supp. 1982).
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ilar to those enumerated in the Kansas statute.157 The Tenth Circuit failed
to explain how these factors might be inconsistent with joint ownership in
Kansas, but consistent with joint ownership in Colorado.
The Imel court distinguished its Hayutin decision, saying that the ques-
tion of the wife's tax liability in the latter case depended upon an interpre-
tation of sections 71 and 215, and that questions of capital gain under
section 1001 were not at issue there.158 The Imel court thus concluded that
its discussion of these issues in Hayutin was neither determinative nor es-
sential to the decision in that case. ' 59 The most casual reading of Hayutin,
however, indicates that the decision relies primarily upon the absence of a
property interest in the wife for its conclusion that payments to her consti-
tuted support or maintenance. 160 The lmel court ultimately admitted that
the essential distinction between its opinions in the second Collins decision
and lIrel, and its other opinions finding a lack of co-ownership in the wife,
was the existence of a state supreme court opinion in the very case being
litigated.'61 Although this factor is of paramount importance in the Tenth
Circuit, and indeed is the only factor that really distinguishes the cases, the
court has yet to describe a sound justification for the difference between
the tax treatment afforded property divisions in Colorado and Oklahoma
and the tax treatment of Kansas property divisions. 62 All three states
have nearly identical statutes, but Kansas lacks the appropriate state court
decision. 63 This reliance on the existence of a state court interpretation
precisely on point and involving the very parties before the court in the tax
matter is both bad policy and misapplication of the role of state law and
the federal tax statute. 164
State law defines the nature of the legal relationships of a particular tax-
payer. Thus the federal courts have appropriately considered such matters
as the time of vesting and other factors utilized by state courts in dividing
marital property to define the nature of a particular property interest under
state law principles. In Bosch v. United States, 165 for example, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Florida wife's "special equity" inter-
est in property in the husband's name is a co-ownership interest for pur-
poses of United States v. Davis.166 The court based its holding on the
157. See Stern & Sellers, supra note 83, at 301.
158. 523 F.2d at 856.
159. Id.
160. Cf. Mills v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 608 (1970) (wife's extensive activities in ranch-
ing operation during marriage gave her property interest so that payments determined to be
property settlement), qt'd, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971).
161. 523 F.2d at 856.
162. See Stern & Sellers, supra note 83, at 300 n.40 (suggestion that IRS will not treat
Kansas marital property divisions as taxable).
163. But see Cady v. Cady, 224 Kan. 339, 581 P.2d 358, 363 (1978) (filing of petition for
divorce or separate maintenance creates a species of common ownership).
164. Hull, The New Uniform Divorce Laws: The Davis Decision, 37 INST. ON FED. TAX'N
§ 36.04, at 36-9 to -10 (1979); Steines, supra note 20, at 236; Comment, The Federal Income
Tax Consequences of Property Settlements in Common Law States and Under the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act: A Proposal, 29 ME. L. REV. 73, 95-98 (1977).
165. 590 F.2d 165 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1979).
166. 590 F.2d at 168; see also Serianni v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1090 (1983) (special
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conclusion that the wife possessed a vested interest in property before di-
vorce and that the property was not transferred to the wife in lieu of a
lump sum alimony payment.' 67 State court labels attached to those rights
and obligations are meaningless for federal tax purposes, however. Fed-
eral tax law is dependent on the legal rights and obligations created by
state law, but the federal tax impact of those rights and obligations is a
question of federal tax law.168 Neither the "species of common owner-
ship" label developed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Collins and
adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court in Imel, nor the Florida "special
equity" label considered in Bosch, should have any impact for federal tax
purposes.' 69 The proper role for state law and state judicial interpretation
of that law lies in identifying the rights and obligations of the parties vis-A-
vis each other. Thus a federal court is bound by the highest state court's
identification and description of the state law property interest. °70 The
federal courts must then develop and apply a rule of federal tax law to
such state-defined rights and obligations. The question must be, therefore,
not whether the highest court in a state defines a spouse's interest as a
species of common ownership, but whether under federal law the state-
created rights and obligations of the spouse are sufficient to meet a federal
standard of co-ownership.' 7 ' The virtually identical property interests in
Colorado, Oklahoma, and Kansas should not generate disparate federal
tax results solely because of state court labels.
In Davis the United States Supreme Court expressed a willingness to
tolerate disparate treatment of property divisions in community property
and common law jurisdictions. 72 What has evolved, however, is a dispar-
ity between common law states with similar statutes in addition to the dis-
parity between community property and common law states. The courts
have been willing to tolerate this disparity, but Congress should not. Con-
gress should act as it has in the past 173 to create uniform tax treatment for
equity interest found by state court constitutes a vested equitable property right that is divis-
ible on divorce without tax).
167. 590 F.2d at 168. This reliance on vesting before divorce is of course inconsistent
with the Tenth Circuit's views in its second Collins opinion, 412 F.2d at 212, and Imel, 523
F.2d at 857, which find a co-ownership interest in the wife whose interest vests only on the
filing of the divorce action, but is in accord with the Tenth Circuit opinions in its first Collins
decision, 388 F.2d at 357-58, and Wiles, 499 F.2d at 259, which conclude that the absence of
a vested interest during marriage defeats co-ownership.
168. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971); Burnett v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103,
110 (1932); see also Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462, 468 (10th Cir. 1974) (state
supreme court's characterization of transfer not controlling for tax purposes).
169. As in Imel, the state court may have no interest in the label attached to marital
property. Yet the Tenth Circuit has allowed the state court to define the federal tax issue.
The ad hoc decision-making so evident in the Tenth Circuit results from that court's reliance
solely upon state judicial decisions.
170. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
171. For example, a federal court might conclude that a federal standard requires a
vested interest during marriage. The federal court would look to state law to ascertain
whether a spouse's interest is vested. If not, there would be no co-ownership, even if the
highest state court labelled the property interest as a species of common ownership.
172. 370 U.S. at 69-70.
173. The income splitting device of the joint return was adopted in 1948 to "produce
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similar transactions in different states. In so doing, Congress should de-
part from the Supreme Court's technical analysis in Davis and look to the
economic nature of the relationship being terminated. Such an inquiry
will provide sound justification for a nonrecognition rule in marital prop-
erty divisions.
Before divorce in a common law state each spouse has a bundle of legal
rights. The husband owns property and the wife possesses inchoate
and/or vested rights in that property. 174 Each of these interests is valuable
and exchangeable for either money or property according to the Davis
court. ' 75 Perhaps the best view of the property division, even if fictional, is
that after divorce each spouse possesses a property interest equivalent to
what he or she owned before divorce, but a division of those interests has
occurred to facilitate termination of the marital relation. A tax free ex-
change of such interests is tolerated where the property exchanged is held
in some form of legal joint ownership such as community property or
where state law is interpreted to create some sort of species of common
ownership. On the other hand, a taxable exchange occurs where the form
of legal ownership is inchoate or not completely vested at some relevant
point in time.
In a divorce proceeding the trial court determines the portion of marital
property each spouse is entitled to receive as his or her separate interest.
One party may be entitled to support from the other, and there may be
some division of property. The only distinction to be drawn is between the
recurring payments of support from current income and an in-kind divi-
sion of property interests both vested and inchoate. 176 Common law and
community property jurisdictions do not differ in this respect. They differ
only as to the rules for allocating property interests and the legal nature of
the relationship. In many common law and some community property ju-
risdictions trial courts are required to make just and equitable divisions of
substantial geographical equalization in the impact of the tax on individual incomes." S.
REP. No. 1013 (pt. 1), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. 1163, 1187.
174. Even if the wife possesses no more than a right to future support, she has a chose in
action against the husband that may encumber his current property and future earnings.
This chose in action, or right to future income, is convertible into current property on an
exchange for lump sum alimony. See H. CLARK, supra note 45, at 447. The common law
dower right of a wife has also been described as an encumbrance on the husband's property.
25 AM. JUR. 2DDower § 6 (1966). Each of these interests in, or restrictions on, property may
be exchanged or given up for a current transfer of property. Legally, and perhaps philo-
sophically, the common law wife's relinquishment of marital rights may be different from
the community property wife's exchange of a vested interest in community property retained
by the husband for an undivided interest in other community property, but economically the
transactions may be identical. This is particularly true when comparing a community prop-
erty state where the divorce court is directed to divide property in an equitable fashion, with
a common law state where the same discretion is given to the divorce court. Equitable
division of community property is provided for in Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-
318A (Supp. 1983-1984); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(l)(b) (1981); Texas, TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1983-1984).
175. 370 U.S. at 72.
176. See Steines, supra note 20, at 236-37.
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marital property.1 77 In a common law system property can be received as
lump sum alimony in exchange for the current right to future support and
a release of other rights.178 In a community property system property can
be received in exchange for the current interest in property retained by the
other spouse. One spouse's possession of sufficient property may relieve
the other spouse of an obligation to pay support. In either system each
spouse retains the equivalent of his or her pre-divorce property interest
and in exchange releases the interest of the other party. Regardless of la-
bels, or the standards for division and determination of proportion, this
exchange and release occurs. An exchange of property or property-like
interests thus takes place in a common law state divorce just as it does in a
community property state divorce. Sound tax policy would not require
recognition of gain in one situation while allowing nonrecognition in the
other. Recognition of gain or loss in both should stand or fall on the same
policy analysis. In that context Davis provides no policy reason for taxing
marital property divisions other than its adherence to a technical analysis
of amount realized.
The policy inquiry should recognize that marital property divisions do
not increase the wealth of either party. After separation each party theo-
retically retains the equivalent of the state law property interest that he or
she possessed before the separation. Although the technical analysis of
Davis finds a realization of gain, there is no true economic benefit to the
spouse transferring appreciated property. Indeed, if we recognize that the
transferor receives nothing of exchangeable value for the appreciated
property, the transferor spouse suffers a net economic loss. The logic that
makes it inappropriate to tax the payor of alimony on funds used to make
the payment also makes it inappropriate to tax the transferor of appreci-
ated property in exchange for a release of the transferee's marital rights.
Finally, the only loss to the Treasury is deferral of recognition. As with
nontaxable divisions of community property, gain or loss will be recog-
nized on final disposition of the property. Using current basis rules for
nontaxable community property divisions places the burden of taxation for
pre-divorce appreciation on the recipient spouse at the time of final
disposition. 179
Some commentators have suggested treating marriage as a partner-
ship.180 Property acquired during marriage would be treated as partner-
ship property, divisible on divorce without taxation. However the result is
justified, a uniform nonrecognition rule for marital property division
177. See supra note 174.
178. See H. CLARK, supra note 45, at 447.
179. This burden may be an inequity in itself. A better basis rule would also divide basis
among husband and wife in proportion to their interest in the marital property. See infra
notes 307-32 and accompanying text (discussing basis and its allocation).
180. Stern & Sellers, supra note 83, at 325-26; Comment, supra note 164, at 91-95; see
also Hjorth, Community Property Marital Settlements: The Problem and a Proposal, 50
WASH. L. REV. 231, 264-75 (1975) (advocating partnership tax treatment for marital divi-
sions of community property).
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serves two important goals of taxation, tax neutrality between similar
transactions in different states, and the ultimate recognition of gain or loss
on the date the gain or loss is realized due to disposition of property.' 8'
B. Division of Jointly Owned Property
The nontaxable division of co-owned property is complicated by the dif-
ficulty of structuring an equal in-kind division of jointly owned property.
The use of separately owned property or a note to equalize property divi-
sion may trigger a taxable event. In addition, even the simplest in-kind
division of joint property raises basis issues making an equal division im-
possible.' 8 2 Before addressing these problems, it is worthwhile to examine
the theory behind nontaxable divisions.
The Board of Tax Appeals first considered the matter in Commissioner v.
Walz. 183 The Board denied a loss to the estate of the deceased husband on
the transfer of depreciated stock to his wife as part of a Texas marital
property settlement. Texas was and remains a community property juris-
diction.' 84 The Board refused to allow a loss where two or more parties
owning a mixed aggregate of assets partitioned the assets. 85 The Board
indicated that the wife received only "that which was hers already" and
that there had been "no sale or exchange of the property in question." 8 6
Conversely, the Tax Court found a taxable exchange of Texas commu-
nity property in Commissioner v. Rouse. 187 The husband in Rouse retained
all of the community property and transferred cash to the wife. The cash
received by the wife was less than the community's cost basis for the assets
retained by the husband. On the subsequent sale of his retained commu-
nity property, the husband claimed the community's basis in the property
as his basis for purposes of computing gain rather than the amount paid to
his ex-wife for her interest in the property. The Fifth Circuit Court of
181. See Steines, supra note 20, at 245-46; 19 BULL. A.B.A. SEC. TAX'N No. 4, 63-66(1966); infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text. In the context of a general proposal for
taxation of appreciation on death, the Treasury Department recommended to Congress that
interspousal transfers, including transfers on divorce, not be taxed. U.S. TREAS. DEvr., 91ST
CONG., lST SESS., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS (pt. 3) 340, 343 n.6 (Comm. Print
1969). The Tax Reform Act of 1983, H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), would treat
property transfers incident to divorce as a gift with the transferor's basis carried over to the
transferee. Id. § 422.
182. See infra notes 307-33 and accompanying text.
183. 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
184. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1975).
185. 32 B.T.A. at 719.
186. Id. at 720. The Board stated that
In the instant case when the one-half interest of the wife in the community
property was set apart to her in the separation agreement, she was only receiv-
ing that which was hers already. We think the situation is not affected by the
fact that [the stock was] awarded to the wife in the division of property and
charged to her at its then fair market value ....
Gain or loss on this property thus divided would depend upon its subse-
quent disposal by the respective parties. Here there has been no sale or ex-
change of the property in question, but a division of the property.
Id. at 719-20.
187. 6 T.C. 908 (1946), aftid, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).
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Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's holding that the property settlement was
a taxable purchase by the husband and sale by the wife, thereby giving the
husband a basis in the retained community property equal to the amount
paid to the wife.' 88
The Tax Court described the property settlement in Rouse as a bargain
and sale. 189 "Such property settlements are arm's length transactions,
valid in all respects. They result in the transfer of property rights or inter-
ests for a consideration, and there is no sufficient reason to distinguish
them from any other transactions fundamentally similar." 90 With respect
to equal in-kind divisions of community property the Tax Court added:
[W]here, in exchange for a vested undivided one-half interest in the
whole, each party receives a vested interest in the whole of one-half,
obviously there would be no resulting taxable gain, and no change in
the basis of any of the property by reason of the settlement. 91
The Board in Walz labelled an equal community property settlement a
nontaxable partition or division of property. 92 The Tax Court in Rouse
referred to the nontaxable settlement as an exchange with no resulting tax-
able gain. 193 Subsequent opinions have also vacillated as to whether the
division of community property should be called an exchange or a parti-
tion.' 94 The authorities are in agreement, however, that an approximately
equal division of community property is not subject to taxation. Judge
Hall, writing for the Tax Court in Carrieres v. Commissioner, 195 put the
issue in proper perspective. She recognized that a division of community
property represents an exchange subject to the provisions of the Code deal-
ing with the sale, exchange, or disposition of property, but added that
"judge-made, well-settled law concerning the division of community prop-
erty upon a divorce makes exceptions to that general rule. In effect, a
nonstatutory nonrecognition rule has been created."' 96
As the Rouse decision points out, each party to a community property
188. 6 T.C. at 911; 159 F.2d at 707.
189. 6 T.C. at 913. The court cited Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125, 130 (9th Cir.
1943). See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
190. 6 T.C. at 913.
191. Id. at 914.
192. 32 B.T.A. at 720.
193. 6 T.C. at 914.
194. See Davidson v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 854, 857 (1982); Siewert v. Com-
missioner, 72 T.C. 326, 332-33 (1979); Harrah v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 735, 748 (1978);
Carson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 818, 820 (1976); Showalter v. Commissioner, 33
T.C.M. (CCH) 192, 194 (1974); Davenport v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 856, 857
(1953) (appeal dismissed on stipulation).
195. 64 T.C. 959 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1, affidper curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1977).
196. Id. at 963; see also Carson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 818, 820 (1978)
(citing Carrieres). Section 1001 of the Code provides that gain or loss on the sale or ex-
change of property is determined by comparing the amount realized, defined as the amount
of money plus the fair market value of property received, with the adjusted basis of the
property given up. I.R.C. § 1001(a)-(b) (1976). Section 1001(c) requires that unless other-
wise provided in the Code this gain or loss must be recognized. Id. § 1001(c). No express
provision exists for nonrecognition of gain or loss on the division of community or other
jointly held marital property. Judge Hall would fill this statutory void with the "well-set-
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division exchanges a one-half interest in the whole of the marital property
for separate ownership of the whole of one-half. 97 Stated differently, in
exchange for the husband's one-half interest in the community assets she
retains, the wife gives up her one-half interest in assets retained by the
husband. This is more than a mere partition or division of jointly owned
property. Each spouse gives up a one-half interest in some property in
exchange for a release of the other party's one-half interest in property that
is retained. Since each party owns an undivided one-half interest in the
community property to begin with, the retention of that other one-half in-
terest could not be the product of an exchange.
Under a technical application of section 1001 of the Code, the amount
realized on this exchange by a spouse is the fair market value of the other
spouse's one-half interest in retained assets. 198 Thus, in exchange for the
one-half interest in property transferred to the wife, the husband realizes
the fair market value of one-half of the joint property he retains. The
adjusted basis of property given up by each party in this exchange is one-
half of the community basis in the property transferred to the other spouse.
Thus, the basis of property given up by the husband is one-half of the
community basis in the property retained by the wife. Realized gain or
loss equals the difference between these two figures. 199
One attempt to avoid the exchange nature of community property divi-
sions would focus on the nature of the property interest being divided. An
exchange is recognized if under state law each spouse owns an undivided
one-half interest in each community asset. In this case there is an ex-
change of a spouse's interest in each asset for the interest of the other in
retained assets. But where each spouse is considered to own an undivided
tied" judge-made nonrecognition rule. Of course, such a nonrecognition rule is unnecessary
if there is merely a partition of jointly held property.
197. Rouse, 6 T.C. at 914.
198. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1976).
199. A simple example will illustrate this proposition. Assume that H and W, a married
couple in a community property state, have two assets, each with a fair market value of $ 100.
Asset X has a basis of $20, and asset Y has a basis of $50. Under a marital property settle-
ment H receives asset X and W receives asset Y. H has exchanged his one-half interest in
asset Y in order to obtain sole ownership of asset X. In doing so he has received W's
interest in X in exchange for his interest in Y. H's amount realized on this exchange is the
fair market value of W's one-half interest in asset X, $50. The other $50 of asset X belonged
to H to begin with. H retains his community interest in X in addition to receiving W's
interest in X in the exchange.
The basis of property given up by H in the exchange is one-half of the community's basis
in asset Y, $25, corresponding to H's one-half interest in asset Y transferred to W. H real-
izes a gain of $25 ($50 - $25), which is not recognized under the judge-made nonrecognition
rule. W realizes a gain of $40. W's amount realized is the $50 value of H's interest in asset
Y received in exchange for her interest in X. The adjusted basis of property given by W is
one-half of the community's basis in asset X, $10. As with H, W's gain is not recognized.
Carrieres, 64 T.C. at 965.
The terms "realized" and "recognized" are used in their technical sense. Gain or loss is
realized when there has been a taxable event such as a sale or exchange of property. Real-
ized gain or loss is generally required to be recognized, thereby having an impact on the
computation of taxable income. I.R.C. § 1001(c) (1976). A number of provisions in the
Code call for nonrecognition of realized gain. See, e.g., id. §§ 351 (West 1978 & Supp.
1983), 1031 (1976), 1034 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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interest in the community property as a whole,200 the commentators sug-
gest that the division is simply a partition of the property rather than an
exchange. 20 1 Labelling the property division as a partition, however, does
not change the fact that each party releases an interest in co-owned prop-
erty in exchange for undivided ownership of the whole of one-half. Each
spouse exchanges an interest in assets transferred to the other for that other
spouse's interest in retained property. Realized gain or loss is the same
however the transaction is analyzed. In an asset by asset exchange the
amount realized may be computed by looking to the sum of one-half the
fair market value of each asset retained by the spouse. When the transac-
tion is viewed as an exchange of one-half of the whole for the whole of
one-half, the amount realized is the same figure. The value of the whole,
and the value of the one-half of the whole retained by a spouse, will be the
sum of the values of the individual assets making up the aggregate. In the
context of a marital property settlement, therefore, the aggregate-entity
distinction has no economic or practical impact, and should not suffice to
create an exchange in the one case but not in the other.202
Whether or not one accepts the description of a community property
division as an exchange, commentators generally agree that allowing the
division without recognition of gain is sound policy.203 An equal division
does not involve a substantial change in the parties' economic position.
Neither party has more than he or she possessed before the division and
may well have less. There is no change in economic wealth presenting an
appropriate occasion for taxation.
More importantly, no conversion of community assets into another form
of investment takes place. Each party retains a continuing investment in
the community property, except that a one-half interest in the whole, or in
200. See supra note 102.
201. Glickfield, Rabow & Schwartz, supra note 71, at 322-23; Schwartz, Divorce and
Taxes.- New Aspects of the Davis Denouement, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 176, 195-96 (1967);
Note, supra note 68, at 483-85.
202. The entity approach to the disposition of assets has been rejected in other contexts.
For example on the sale of a going business the tax consequences are determined using an
asset-by-asset analysis of the transaction. State law does not recognize the sole proprietor-
ship as a separate legal entity. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945). The
asset-by-asset approach must also be utilized when transferring a going business to a con-
trolled corporation in exchange for stock in an I.R.C. § 351 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983) trans-
action, Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140; B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 3-23 to -24 (3d ed. 1971); or in a like-
kind exchange under I.R.C. § 1031 (1976) where more than one asset is transferred, Treas.
Reg. § 1.1031 (d)-1 (e). Contrast this asset-by-asset approach with the entity theory utilized in
the sale of an incorporated business. Since a corporation is recognized as an entity separate
from its owners, the sale of the entity is treated as the sale of the whole, the entity itself. By
specific statute the sale of a partnership interest is also treated as a sale of an interest in the
entity, but because of differing conceptual views of the status of a partnership as an aggre-
gate or entity, the matter must be resolved by statute. See I.R.C. § 741 (1976). The partner-
ship, however, is also treated as an aggregate with respect to certain assets. Id. § 751 (West
1982 & Supp. 1983). The marital community is not an entity separate from the marital
partners who own the assets. To recognize it as such for tax purposes would contradict
accepted principles applicable to dispositions of mixed groups of assets.
203. See, e.g., Glickfield, Rabow & Schwartz, supra note 71, at 339-40; Schwartz, supra
note 201, at 186-87.
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each of the individual assets, has been exchanged for a separate full own-
ership interest in the retained one-half. As in the case of a like-kind ex-
change 204 or the tax free transfer of property to a controlled
corporation, 20 5 the spouse's economic position remains tied to the prop-
erty. In this regard, it is also important to recognize that, as in other non-
recognition transactions, an in-kind division of community property does
not convert community assets into cash or other liquid property that may
be used to pay tax.2°6
Finally, the revenue loss incurred by the Treasury due to the nonrecog-
nition rule in community property divisions would not be great.20 7 With
appropriate basis rules, the taxation of appreciated property occurs at final
disposition. The Code already adopts this philosophy in a number of ar-
eas and its application to marital property divisions is no less appropriate.
These justifications for nonrecognition on equal division of community
property apply with equal force to the division of marital property in a
common law jurisdiction. They are sufficiently strong in both cases to jus-
tify passage of a statutory nonrecognition rule of uniform application.
C Bargain and Sale Cases. Conversion into Cash or Property Other
than Community Assets
The identification of an exchange in a division of jointly owned marital
property may be insignificant where the policy decision not to tax has been
made. Where cash, a note, or the separate property of one of the spouses is
involved in the transaction, however, the authorities have uniformly relied
on the exchange nature of the transaction to justify taxation.208 Recogni-
204. I.R.C. § 1031(a) (1976) provides that "[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized if prop-
erty held for productive use in trade or business or for investment ... is exchanged solely
for property of a like kind to be held either for productive use in trade or business or for
investment."
205. Id. § 351(a) (Supp. V 1981) provides that "[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized if
property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock
or securities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or persons
are in control ... of the corporation."
206. Note, however, that in statutory nonrecognition transactions the conversion of prop-
erty into cash, the receipt of boot, requires recognition of gain, at least to the extent of boot
received. Id. §§ 351(b) (1976), 356(a) (West 1976 & Supp. 1983), 1031(b) (1976). The prin-
cipal justification for nonrecognition is the taxpayer's continuing relationship with the in-
vestment. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 202, at 3-4 (§ 351); FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, supra note 69, at 870 (§ 1031). To the extent that this relationship is terminated
with the receipt of cash or other boot not provided for in the nonrecognition provision, the
continuing relationship with the investment ceases, and gain is recognized to the extent of
boot. A similar relationship exists with respect to a division of marital property on divorce.
Each spouse maintains a continuing interest in marital property that justifies the judge-made
nonrecognition rule applied to divisions of community property.
207. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that a nonrecognition rule
treating property transfers incident to divorce as gifts with carryover basis would reduce
revenues by less than $5 million annually. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON-TAXATION, 98TH
CONG., I ST SES., DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3475, TAX LAW SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVEMENT
ACT OF 1983, at 10 (Comm. Print 1983).
208. Siewert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 326, 332 (1979); Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64
T.C. 959, 967-68 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1, aft'dper curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977);
Conner v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1043 (1975); May v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M.
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tion of gain or loss may be appropriate where cash or a note is involved,
but recognition where separate property is exchanged in-kind for joint
property is questionable.
1. Exchange for Cash
A cash transaction such as that in Rouse v. Commissioner 209 is referred
to as a "bargain and sale" in contrast to a "partition" of community prop-
erty, and is fully taxable. One party is said to dispose of an interest in
community property in exchange for consideration.210 The existence of
such consideration supposedly negates the idea that the division is a parti-
tion of assets. 21 The cash transaction differs significantly from an in-kind
exchange, even where the cash is itself community property, since the
spouse receiving cash for an interest in community property is converting
an interest in property into cash. Unlike an in-kind exchange of property
interests where gain or loss may be recognized on the future termination of
a continuing interest in property, the receipt of cash completes the invest-
ment.212 The termination of an investment in the property marks the point
at which gain should be recognized.
Only one reported decision has addressed the receipt of community cash
in exchange for a spouse's interest in other community property. In Daven-
port v. Commissioner 213 the wife received $502,900 of community cash plus
certain property interests for the purpose of equalizing a division of Texas
community property. The Commissioner argued that the property divi-
sion was a taxable bargain and sale, citing Rouse .2 14 The Tax Court dis-
agreed and distinguished the transaction from Rouse on the grounds that
both community and separate property were involved in Rouse whereas
only community property was transferred in Davenport. 215 Contrary to the
result in Davenport, however, recognition of gain may be appropriate
where a spouse receives more than her share of community cash. Mrs.
Davenport received a disproportionate share of community cash to equal-
ize her husband's retention of other community assets and thereby con-
(CCH) 256 (1974); Edwards v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 65, 68-69 (1954); Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 948 (1953); Rouse v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 908, 914 (1946), aft'd,
159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947); But see Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718, 719-20 (1935).
209. 6 T.C. 908 (1946), a'd, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).
210. Edwards v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 65, 70 (1954); Rouse, 6 T.C. at 913.
211. Even an equal in-kind division of community property, however, is an exchange in
which consideration is present. See supra notes 187-203 and accompanying text.
212. Property received in a nonrecognition transaction will obtain a basis either from
property given up in the exchange or the carryover basis of the transferor. In either case
gain or loss on ultimate disposition of the property will be measured by the difference be-
tween this basis, plus or minus adjustments to basis, and the amount realized. Unlike other
property, cash does not fluctuate in value. Thus the basis of cash received in a nonrecogni-
tion transaction is always equivalent to its face value. On conversion of property into money
the appreciation or depreciation of the property will never be recognized for tax purposes
unless tax is imposed or some other provision is made to account for the basis inherent in the
money.
213. 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 856 (1953) (appeal dismissed on stipulation).
214. 6 T.C. at 914.
215. 12 T.C.M. (CCH) at 858.
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verted her interest in community assets into cash. Any appreciation in the
property so exchanged was realized by her at the time of the exchange and
her gain or loss was marked to the extent that property was converted into
cash. Nonetheless, the Tax Court determined that the transfer of commu-
nity cash was nontaxable. 216 One should note that the spouse receiving
cash cannot claim that taxation is an undue burden since cash is available
to pay the tax. Further, under current basis rules the spouse receiving cash
obtains a step-up in basis without recognizing any gain.217
The receipt of cash in a marital property division is analogous to the
receipt of cash in a statutory nonrecognition exchange. In most such trans-
actions gain is recognized to the extent that cash is extracted from the con-
tinuing investment. 218 Applying this principle to the division of marital
property results in the recognition of gain to a spouse receiving more than
his or her share of the community cash. To the extent cash is received for
an interest in community assets, the spouse's investment in those assets
terminates since a disposition of property for cash occurs. The retention of
a spouse's one-half share of community cash would not result in recogni-
tion, however. This cash, the spouse's retained one-half interest, is not
received in exchange for a release of other assets.
An alternative proposal would treat the division of marital property as
the dissolution of a partnership. 219 Cash received by a partner on liquida-
tion of a partnership interest is treated as a partnership distribution under
section 731.220 The partner recognizes no gain unless cash received ex-
ceeds the partner's basis in his partnership interest. Where the partnership
is completely liquidated, the partner's basis in other distributed assets is
reduced by the cash received. 221 The partner is allowed to defer gain real-
ized on the partnership liquidation until disposition of the in-kind assets.
In a marital property settlement this approach requires recognition of gain
only to the extent that a spouse receives cash in excess of the spouse's basis
in retained community property. The basis of retained property would be
reduced by the cash received in excess of the recipient's share of commu-
nity cash. This approach requires complete recognition of gain in the
216. Id.
217. Hjorth, supra note 180, at 242.
218. I.R.C. § 1031(b) (1976), for example, provides:
If an exchange would be within the provisions of subsection (a) . . . if it
were not for the fact that the property received in exchange consists not only
of property permitted by such provisions to be received without the recogni-
tion of gain, but also of other property or money, then the gain, if any, to the
recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not in excess of the sum of
such money and the fair market value of such other property.
219. Hjorth, supra note 180, at 264-66.
220. I.R.C. § 731 (1976).
221. Id. § 731(a)(1) provides in the case of a distribution to a partner that "gain shall not
be recognized to such partner, except to the extent that any money distributed exceeds the
adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership immediately before the distribu-
tion ...... In addition, "[tlhe basis of property (other than money) distributed by a part-
nership to a partner in liquidation of the partner's interest shall be an amount equal to the
adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership reduced by any money distributed
in the same transaction." Id. § 732(b).
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Rouse type of transaction where only cash is received. Where a spouse
receives property in addition to cash, recognition would be deferred until
disposition of the property. The partnership approach deprives the Treas-
ury of tax on gain where a party has cashed out of an investment. As to
separating individuals, however, it has the advantage of avoiding an addi-
tional financial burden at a difficult time.
To compare these possibilities, assume that a couple's assets consist of a
house with a fair market value of $50,000 and a basis of $20,000, and cash
of $50,000. The wife receives the house and the husband takes the cash in
an equal division of community property. The husband has exchanged his
one-half interest in the house for the wife's interest in $25,000 of cash. The
husband's basis in his one-half interest in the house is $10,000, so he real-
izes a gain of $15,000. There is little reason to allow nonrecognition in this
transaction even though the transaction is arguably a partition of the
jointly held marital property. Although the husband is in the same eco-
nomic position in terms of overall net worth before and after the division,
he has converted his interest in the house into cash. In addition, the hus-
band no longer possesses an asset that will allow the Treasury to recoup
tax on a later disposition. As cash must be deemed to have a basis equal to
its face value, disposition of the cash will not occasion recognition of gain
or loss. If the husband escapes tax on this transaction he effectively ob-
tains a tax-free step-up in basis,222 thereby permanently escaping taxa-
tion.223 If gain is recognized by the husband on this transaction, he can
pay the tax without the added burden of converting additional assets into
cash to meet his tax liability.
If the husband's gain is not recognized, the Treasury will recoup tax on
the appreciation when the house is sold by the wife. Under current basis
rules, the wife takes the house with the community's basis of $10,000.224
Thus, the wife will realize the full amount of appreciation on disposition of
the property. An unfair imposition of tax on the wife results because the
husband is the one who converted an interest in property into cash with its
attendant step-up in basis.
To examine the partnership approach assume the presence of an addi-
tional $60,000 of stock with a $50,000 basis to the marital community. As-
sume that the stock is divided equally between husband and wife so that
the husband receives $50,000 of cash and one-half of the stock, and the
wife receives the house and one-half of the stock. Again the husband has
exchanged his one-half interest in the house for $25,000 cash. The reasons
for recognizing gain considered in the first example still apply. The hus-
band has converted his investment in the house into cash. The cash is
222. Hjorth, supra note 180, at 242.
223. The same tax result is obtained in this hypothetical whether gain is recognized
under Professor Hjorth's partnership approach or under a rule requiring recognition of gain
to the extent of cash. As described in the text, the difference occurs only when both cash and
other property is received.
224. Harrah v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 735, 748 (1978); Oliver v. Commissioner, 8
T.C.M. (CCH) 403, 430 (1949).
1984]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
available to pay the husband's tax liability. 225 The partnership approach,
however, defers recognition of this gain. Under the partnership approach
the husband is allowed to extract cash in exchange for his interest in com-
munity property to the extent of his basis in community assets. The hus-
band's share of the community basis in the house is $10,000 and in the
stock is $25,000. The $25,000 cash received for his interest in the house
does not exceed this combined basis, so the husband recognizes no gain.
Recognition by the husband is deferred until disposition of his stock for
$30,000. The receipt of cash reduces the husband's basis in the stock to
$10,000.226 On disposition of the stock the husband recognizes $20,000 of
gain consisting of the $15,000 of deferred gain on the conversion of his
interest in the house into cash, plus $5,000 of gain on his one-half interest
in the stock. Although this deferral is technically achievable, there is little
reason to allow the husband to avoid recognition of gain on the conversion
of his interest in the house into cash simply because he receives an addi-
tional asset.
2. Exchange for a Note
A similar recognition issue exists with respect to the receipt of a note in
exchange for an interest in community property. The exchange of prop-
erty for a note is not significantly different from the exchange for cash.
The principal distinction is that the note represents a right to future cash
payments. The recipient of the note is again converting property into cash,
only in this case the cash will be paid in the future. The courts have added
an additional distinction that causes recognition in the exchange of a note
for community property where the current receipt of cash may not. The
courts have concluded that a note represents a promise payable out of the
separate property of the obligor, specifically the obligor's post-divorce
earnings, which are not community property.227 The courts have thus
identified a consideration in the form of separate property to support rec-
ognition of gain. Comparing this treatment with an equal division of com-
munity property where one spouse currently receives a disproportionate
share of community cash in exchange for an interest in other community
assets reveals a flaw in the present recognition scheme. The recipient of
community cash may not be required to recognize gain,228 even though
225. Note also that in a state such as California where only immediate tax consequences
are taken into account, see In re Marriage of Fonstein, 17 Cal. 3d 738, 749-50, 552 P.2d
1169, 1176, 131 Cal. Rptr. 873, 880 (1976), the tax consequences of the property division may
be accounted for in the property settlement.
226. Under Professor Hjorth's partnership approach the husband's basis in the marital
community would be one-half of the total basis in community property, $10,000 for the
house, $25,000 for the stock, and $25,000 for the cash, a total of $60,000. Hjorth, supra note
180, at 266-67. On the property division $50,000 of this basis is allocated to cash. This
leaves only $10,000 of basis for allocation to the stock. The analogous partnership provision
is I.R.C. § 732(b) (1976).
227. May v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 256, 258 (1974); Edwards v. Commis-
sioner, 22 T.C. 65, 69 (1954); Brown v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 948, 952 (1953).
228. Davenport v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 856, 858 (1953) (appeal dismissed
on stipulation).
[Vol. 37
WEALTH TRANSFERS ON DIVORCE
that person can pay the tax due to the presence of the cash. The recipient
of a promise to pay cash in the future is subject to immediate recognition
of gain. The practical result is that parties with access to liquid cash may
escape tax liability while those who must generate cash from future earn-
ings are subject to tax.
Recognized gain on an exchange of community property for a note can
be deferred under the installment sale rules of section 453,229 which defer
recognition until receipt of the cash payment. Here the distinction be-
tween separate and community property becomes paramount. The current
receipt of cash in exchange for community property may not be taxable if
the exchange is treated as a partition of community assets. 230 The receipt
of cash at some point in the future requires recognition of gain on receipt
of the cash because the authorities find an exchange, not from the conver-
sion of property into cash, but from the fact that the cash represents the
separate property of the payor. Whether the cash comes from the separate
or community property of the payor, and whether it is received contempo-
raneously with the property settlement or at a later date pursuant to a note,
the recipient of cash has converted an interest in property into cash. The
conversion to cash justifies recognition of gain on the marital property
division.
Recognition of gain on receipt of cash in exchange for an interest in
marital property also eliminates the impact that the time of borrowing may
have on the transaction. Some commentators have suggested that the ad-
verse tax consequences of an equalizing note can be avoided with a pre-
divorce borrowing from a third party lender.23' Under state law both the
debt and the proceeds of the borrowing belong to the community.232 Thus
a subsequent division allocating the loan proceeds to one party while the
note is paid by the other is arguably tax free. In Siewert v. Commis-
sioner233 the Tax Court held, however, that since a pre-divorce borrowing
to equalize a Texas community property division would be satisfied with
the separate property of the husband, the transaction was a taxable sale. 23
4
Allowing this transaction to result in a tax treatment different from that
applied to the transfer of an equalizing note to a spouse would elevate
form over substance. More importantly, the fact remains that the party
receiving the loan proceeds is converting an interest in property into cash.
The conversion of property into either present or future cash remains the
229. I.R.C. § 453 (Supp. V 1981).
230. Davenport v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 856, 858 (1953) (appeal dismissed
on stipulation).
231. Biblin, Divorce, Taxes and Community Property.- Some Current Cases, Problems and
Concerns, 30 S. CAL. TAX INST. 571, 580-82 (1978); Bost & Kimball, Divorces in Community
Property States.- Selected Tax Problems, 37 INsT. ON FED. TAX'N § 35.02[51, at 35-18 (1979).
232. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-215 (1976); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5116 (West 1983);
IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (Supp. 1983); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2359-2362 (Supp. 1983); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 123.050 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-9 (1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 5.62 (Vernon 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.200 (Supp. 1983-1984).
233. 72 T.C. 326 (1976).
234. 1d. at 335.
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appropriate event for recognition of gain since, in either event, the recipi-
ent has terminated his or her investment in property.
Finally, the treatment of cash suggested here is consistent with the ap-
proach adopted by Congress for alimony payments since sections 71 and
215 also place the tax burden on the person receiving cash or other eco-
nomic benefit. 235 Requiring recognition of gain on the receipt of cash in
excess of a spouse's share of community cash simply places the burden of
taxation on the party converting property into cash, that is, the person who
realizes the economic value of appreciation to the date of conversion. The
existing scheme causes an exactly opposite impact by placing the tax bur-
den of appreciation on the person parting with cash in exchange for a
spouse's interest in retained property. Requiring recognition of gain by the
spouse cashing out an interest in marital property appropriately shifts the
tax burden of the conversion of property to cash to the recipient of the
cash.
Based on the foregoing, the author recommends that equal division of
property on divorce, whether in a community property or common law
jurisdiction, be treated as a statutory nonrecognition transaction. No gain
or loss should be recognized where a spouse receives an interest in prop-
erty, or is released from a marital obligation, in exchange for property
transferred to a former spouse on divorce. The only exception is the recog-
nition of gain by a spouse to the extent of cash or notes received in ex-
change for an interest in marital property.
D. Taxable Unequal Divisions of Jointly Owned Property
In between the bargain and sale cases, which require complete recogni-
tion of gain or loss, and the nontaxable equal division of jointly owned
marital property, lies the analytically more difficult transaction involving
an unequal division of community assets with an equalization provision.
Difficulties arise where a major portion of the marital estate consists of a
single asset or an indivisible collection of assets such as a going business.
In such a case the spouse retaining the major asset must compensate the
other with a transfer of separate property. The result is a taxable unequal
division of jointly owned property. The equalization payment may in-
clude an in-kind transfer of separately owned assets, cash, or a promise to
pay cash in the future. The courts have analyzed transactions with equali-
zation payments by finding a taxable exchange of separate for community
property, rather than a partition of assets. 236
Although the authorities have uniformly adopted the rule that a com-
pletely equal division of jointly owned property on divorce is not taxable,
both the Tax Court and the Internal Revenue Service have expressed a de
235. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
236. See Carson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 818 (1978); Carrieres v. Commis-
sioner, 64 T.C. 959, 965 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1, aff'dper curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1977). No distinctions have been drawn between different forms of consideration.
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minimis rule that allows a small deviation from equality. 237 As a practical
matter this poses little difficulty since the imprecise science of appraisal
leaves ample room to effect a mutually agreeable yet nominally equal
property division.238 Not surprisingly, most negotiation begins with the
allocation of specific assets upon which a valuation is placed after division
so as to give the appearance of an equal division.
The Tax Court addressed the problem of a truly unequal property divi-
sion in Carrieres v. Commissioner.239 In a California divorce the husband
retained all of the stock of a family business. The stock represented more
than one-half of the value of the entire community property. In order to
equalize the property division the divorce court ordered the husband to
give his wife a note in addition to the other community assets retained by
her. After the divorce, and in settlement of a subsequent dispute, the hus-
band settled the note with cash obtained partly from a borrowing from the
corporation, partly from his one-half of the community cash on hand at
the time of divorce, and partly from separate property cash. The Commis-
sioner asserted that the wife was required to recognize gain on the sale of
her interest in the stock of the family corporation. The wife claimed that
the transaction was a tax-free partition of community property.
As described above, the Tax Court in Carrieres recognized the exchange
nature of marital property divisions.24° The court categorized taxable ex-
changes into two groups, an unequal division where one spouse receives
more than one-half of the value of community assets, and an equal divi-
sion where one spouse gives his note or separate property for substantially
all of the other spouse's interest in community property.24' The Carrieres
property division fit into the latter category. The court held, however, that
the use of separate property to acquire a part of the community assets
237. In Carson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 818 (1978), the Tax Court said that a
division of 46.2% of community assets to one party and 53.8% to the other was not suffi-
ciently disproportionate as to allow the husband to recognize a loss on the exchange. Id. at
821; see Davidson v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 854 (1982) (appeal pending). The
Service opined in Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213, that an equalizing note in the amount of
$258 in a division of $300,000 of community property "is not of sufficient magnitude to
prevent the division from being approximately equal." Further, the Tax Court in Conner v.
Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1043 (1975), stated that "[a] slight inequity in the division
does not mandate a characterization of the transaction as a sale. Thus, a good faith attempt
to divide the property with each spouse receiving property approximately equal in total
value will be [a] nontaxable division despite the slight difference in value." Id. at 1045. The
permissible degree of inequality is an open question.
238. Bost & Kimball, supra note 231, § 35.02[2), at 35-7.
239. 64 T.C. 959 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1, a f'dper curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1977).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 195-96.
241. 64 T.C. at 964. The cases generally cited for the proposition that an unequal divi-
sion is a taxable exchange, including those cited in Carrieres, should be recognized as in-
volving an exchange of community assets for cash or a note, the transformation of an
interest in property into either present or future money. Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d
471 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 818 (1949), differs only slightly in that the husband
was required to make a current purchase of an annuity policy for the wife's interest in com-
munity assets. No cases have been found that require recognition in a purely unequal divi-
sion of community property not involving cash or a note. See Hjorth, supra note 180, at 233
n.9.
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should not preclude application of the nonrecognition principle to commu-
nity property retained by a spouse. "Otherwise there would be introduced
a 'cliff effect' under which the use of even $1 of separate property to rem-
edy a disparity in the division of community property would render en-
tirely inapplicable the protection of the nonstatutory nonrecognition
principle .... -242 The court concluded that its judge-made nonrecogni-
tion principle applies to the extent that an exchange of interests in commu-
nity property takes place, but that gain will be recognized to the extent that
a spouse exchanges his interest in community property for the separate
property of the other spouse.243 Thus, the wife's receipt of a note or other
separate property for a portion of her community property required the
recognition of gain.
Identifying the portion of a spouse's community property exchanged for
the separate property of the other, and thereby computing the recognized
gain, is the most difficult part of the Carrieres opinion. The court's ap-
proach is best analyzed by studying the specific facts of the case. The net
value of community assets was approximately $388,200.244 The husband,
George, received community cash of $15,200, a one-half interest in a par-
cel of community real estate, and the stock of the family business valued at
$241,000. The wife, Jean, received a one-half interest in the real estate,
community cash of $15,200, other community assets with a net value of
$61,700, and George's note for $89,600 payable over a period of twelve
years. 245 Before the divorce court entered final judgment, George agreed
to pay the note in a lump sum. He obtained cash by borrowing $65,000
from the family corporation, using $13,100 of the community cash received
in the initial settlement, and contributing $11,500 of cash from his separate




Real property $ 27,500 Real property $ 27,500
Stock 241,000 Community assets 61,700
Cash 2,000 Community cash 28,300
Less cash paid (76,500) Cash from husband 76,500
TOTAL $194,000 TOTAL $194,000
The Tax Court concluded that Jean received the $13,100 of community
cash from George as part of the tax-free division of community prop-
erty.246 The remaining $76,500 of the cash came from George's separate
242. 64 T.C. at 965.
243. Id. at 965-66.
244. For convenience all figures are rounded to the nearest $100.
245. The figures given here are net of community liabilities. Mrs. Carrieres took two
properties subject to encumbrances totalling approximately $9600.
246. Id. at 967. The court relied on the holding in Davenport v. Commissioner, 12
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property247 and was therefore received by Jean as consideration for her
sale of community property. Jean's gain on this sale was recognized.
Recognition of gain on Jean's sale of community property for cash re-
quired an allocation of the cash sales price to particular assets. The alloca-
tion was necessary to identify the property given up in the exchange,
ascertain its basis, and compute gain. 248 The court began its inquiry by
looking to the intent of the parties. This investigation revealed that
George's separate property was exchanged for the stock, the major com-
munity asset.249 Thus Jean's gain was computed using her basis in the
stock. She received $120,500 of assets for her one-half interest in the stock.
$76,500 of this amount came from George's separate property and was
subject to tax, while $44,000 of the proceeds represented a nontaxable ex-
change. The court thus concluded that Jean recognized $76,500/$120,500,
approximately 63.5%, of her realized gain on the stock sale. 2
50
The Service acquiesced in Carrieres, but in the result only.25 1 Prior to
Carrieres the Service had indicated, albeit in a different situation, that it
preferred an alternate approach to the allocation problem. In Revenue
Ruling 74-347 the Service ruled on the tax consequences of an unequal
division of jointly owned property where no separate property was given to
equalize the disparity.252 The assets of husband and wife totalled
$110,000. $70,000 of that property was jointly held. The remaining
$40,000 was the separate property of the husband. The divorce decree
awarded the wife jointly owned property with a net fair market value of
$55,000. The remaining $15,000 of joint property was awarded to the hus-
band along with his $40,000 separate property. In table form, the division
looked like this:
T.C.M. (CCH) 856 (1953). See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text (nontaxability of
receipt of excess share of community cash).
247. 64 T.C. at 967. Jean argued that the proceeds of George's borrowing from the cor-
poration were community property and thus received by her as part of the tax-free property
division. The court's response stated only that "[t]he loan was made from a corporation all
of the stock of which was set aside to George as his separate property. In no manner, techni-
cal or nontechnical, could the proceeds of the loan George took from Sono-Ceil Company
be considered other than his separate property." Id.
248. The court recognized the difficulty with this allocation by asking, "[wihere a spouse
conveys his interest in both high-basis and low-basis community assets to his spouse for a
consideration including both separate and community assets, should he be deemed to have
'sold' the low-basis community assets and 'divided' the high-basis community assets, or vice
versa?" Id. at 966.
249. Id. Commentators were quick to recognize the flexibility provided by the court's
allocation. See, e.g., Bost & Kimball, supra note 231, § 35.02[4], at 35-17; Hjorth, supra note
176, at 247-48. Any person aware of the result would allocate separate assets to an exchange
of high-basis community property. Except in a case involving a single major asset such as
Carrieres, the allocation process is relatively free from restraint. The court in Carrieres did
not deal with the case where the intent of the parties is not easily ascertained.
250. 64 T.C. at 967-68.
251. 1976-2 C.B. 1.
252. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26.
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TABLE II
HUSBAND WIFE
Joint property $ 15,000 Joint property $ 55,000
Separate property 40,000
TOTAL $ 55,000 TOTAL $ 55,000
The Service opined that insofar as a division of jointly owned property
occurred, the transaction was tax free, but this result applied only to
$35,000 of the property received by the wife, representing her one-half
share of the jointly held property. The remaining $20,000 of jointly owned
property received by the wife was said to have been received for her re-
lease of marital rights. 253 Thus the husband realized the fair market value
of a release of his wife's marital rights in exchange for $20,000 of joint
property. The Service ruled that this was a taxable exchange under United
States v. Davis.254 The value of the release realized by the husband was
equivalent to the value of the property given in exchange, the $20,000 ex-
cess of joint property retained by the wife.
Unlike the court's quest in Carrieres for the identity of the specific asset
exchanged in the recognition transaction, the Service determined the basis
of property given up by the husband in Revenue Ruling 74-347 as a pro-
portion of the husband's total basis in the joint property.255 The Service
concluded that since $20,000 of the $55,000 of joint property retained by
the wife was received in exchange for her release of marital rights,
$20,000/$55,000 of the total basis of the property retained by the wife was
the basis of property given up by the husband. The Service used this basis
to compute the husband's recognized gain.256
Identifying recognized gain as a proportionate part of the gain realized
253. 1974-2 C.B. at 27.
254. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
255. 1974-2 C.B. at 27; see Conner v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1043, 1046
(1975).
256. Although gain was determined by looking at the assets in the aggregate, the ruling
looked to individual assets to determine the adjusted basis of property given up by the hus-
band. The adjusted basis of all jointly held property received by the wife was $29,200.
$4000 of this basis was attributable to household furniture with a fair market value of only
$2000. Because no loss can be recognized on the sale of such a personal item, see I.R.C.
§§ 165 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983), 262 (1976), the ruling provided that the basis of the furni-
ture in excess of fair market value could not be used in computing the husband's gain on the
transfer. The basis of property retained by the wife was thereby reduced to $27,500. The
husband's basis in property given up was computed as ($27,500) ($20,000/$55,000) =
$10,000. The husband's realized and recognized gain was $10,000, ($20,000 - $10,000).
Professor Hjorth criticized the ruling for using an aggregate approach for determining
gain while using an asset-by-asset approach for determining basis. Hjorth, supra note 180,
at 254. The gain derived from the formula in the ruling, however, is simply the algebraic
sum of the gain realized on each asset. Whether gain is computed in the aggregate or on an
asset-by-asset basis makes no difference to the result in this circumstance. This result is
consistent with that obtained on the transfer of an aggregate of assets to a controlled corpo-
ration in exchange for stock where gain is recognized because of the presence of boot. I.R.C.
§ 35 1(b) (1976). The single figure for gain realized is the sum of the gain on each individual
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on each asset produces a more realistic result than the Carrieres court's
focus on a single asset. This approach recognizes that each asset given up
by a spouse is exchanged for a proportionate part of each asset received.
The approach is also less complex because it eliminates the need to iden-
tify a specific asset as the subject of the recognition portion of the ex-
change.257 The holding in Revenue Ruling 74-347,258 however, produces
the inequity generated by the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v.
Davis.259 The husband parts with a disproportionate share of jointly
owned property, yet, despite this loss, he is also burdened with a tax on the
transfer.
In the context of a community property state the ruling presents a sec-
ond, less practical, but more analytical defect. 260 Where support is sepa-
rately provided for, a wife in a community property state receiving more
than one-half of the community assets cannot be said to give up marital
rights in exchange for the property, since she has no additional rights to
give.261 If this is true, the Service's conclusion that the husband gives in
excess of his one-half share of community property in exchange for a re-
lease of the wife's marital rights cannot be supported.
262
A superior analysis of the unequal division follows from the recommen-
dation that in-kind marital property divisions be treated like other statu-
tory nonrecognition exchanges. Equal or not, each party to a marital
property settlement can be said to receive the equivalent of the bundle of
rights each possessed prior to divorce. There is no accession to economic
wealth in this exchange and thus no event upon which a tax should be
imposed. Furthermore, even if gain is technically realized, the gain has
not been extracted from a continuing investment in property. Because ap-
asset determined by comparing each asset's basis with its fair market value. See Rev. Rul.
68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140; B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 202, at 3-24.
257. This conclusion can be demonstrated by applying the approach of Rev. Rul. 74-347,
1974-2 C.B. 26, to the facts of Carrieres. Jean received $117,500 of community property plus
$76,500 of cash from George's separate property in exchange for her interest in the commu-
nity property retained by George. Thus, $76,500/$194,000 or 39.4% of the property ob-
tained by Jean was realized in a taxable sale. Her basis for the property given up would be
39.4% of the aggregate basis of the property retained by George. In effect Jean would be
deemed to have transferred her interest in each community asset retained by George for
both the separate property cash and George's interest in her retained community assets.
Contrast this with the result reached in Carrieres where the court held that the cash received
by Jean was received solely in exchange for her interest in the stock retained by George.
258. 1974-2 C.B. 26.
259. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
260. Several community property states sanction an unequal division of community
property in the discretion of the trial court unless the trial court makes such an arbitrarily
disproportionate division as to be inequitabia. See supra note 174.
261. Biblin, supra note 231, at 583-84. "One could argue that the husband is giving up
additional property for freedom or in purchaie of an expedient settlement. If true, the hus-
band is making a payment for status. Such status gain, at least to the wife, is not taxable
under Davis, 370 U.S. at 73 n.7. • 0
262. This argument might be taken a step, further. If the wife has nothing to give up, the
husband has realized nothing on the exchange of a disproportionate share of community
property. The husband's amount realized for this property is zero, so there is a realized loss
on the unequal division that could be recognized, but only if the exchange occurs after di-
vorce. See I.R.C. § 267 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983).
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preciation may always be taxed upon the ultimate disposition of the appre-
ciated asset, nonrecognition is the most appropriate and equitable result
for both parties. Thus the nonrecognition rule should be applied to any in-
kind division of property incident to divorce or separation. Where a
spouse terminates an interest in marital property in exchange for cash or a
note, however, gain should be recognized to the extent of the cash or note.
E. Miscellaneous Problems
The nonrecognition model solves other problems encountered on divi-
sion of community property in addition to the unequal division and cash
transaction issues. These problems include release of indebtedness, assign-
ment of income, and recognition of loss.
.. Release of Indebtedness
Where encumbered property or community debt is divided in a property
settlement, most courts look to the net value of property retained by each
spouse to determine whether a tax free equal division has occurred.263
Recognize, however, that the community liability assumed by a spouse on
divorce will be satisfied out of the separate property of the spouse. In this
sense the transaction is similar to an equalizing note payable out of the
obligor's separate property, or an immediate transfer of cash from the obli-
gor's separate property.264
The role of liabilities in a marital property division can be analyzed with
the principles applied in statutory nonrecognition transactions. The
amount realized on the disposition of property includes the amount of any
indebtedness assumed by the transferee or to which the transferred prop-
erty is subject.265 Thus the amount realized by a spouse transferring an
interest in encumbered property or community debts includes the indebt-
edness assumed by the other spouse. 266 The assumption of a spouse's
share of community debt may be viewed as the payment of cash that the
recipient uses to satisfy the creditor. 267 If the receipt of cash in excess of a
spouse's share of community cash results in the recognition of gain, 268 then
the relief from indebtedness may also result in recognition of gain. Unlike
263. Davidson v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 854, 857 (1982) (appeal pending);
Carson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 818, 819 (1978); Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64
T.C. 959, 964-65 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1, affdper curiam, 522 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977);
Wren v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 290, 293 (1965).
264. As a practical matter, both an assumed community debt and an equalization note
would be paid out of the spouse's post-divorce earnings, which are separate property. See,
eg., Siewert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 326, 335 (1979).
265. Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S. Ct. 1826, 1831, 75 L. Ed. 2d 863, 871 (1983); Crane v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1946).
266. For convenience the term "indebtedness" is used to include nonrecourse debt as
well as personal liabilities. "Assumption" includes the receipt of property subject to a non-
recourse liability even though this usage is technically incorrect.
267. See, e.g., United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938).
268. See supra notes 209-26 and accompanying text (recognition of gain to extent of
excess community cash received).
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the recipient of cash, however, the spouse relieved of an indebtedness does
not obtain liquid assets with which to pay tax. This paramount policy con-
sideration recommends application of a nonrecognition principle to
indebtedness.
Again, reference to statutory nonrecognition rules provides guidance. In
corporate organizations and reorganizations gain is not recognized on an
assumption of liabilities unless the transaction is motivated by tax avoid-
ance or the liabilities assumed exceed the transferor's basis in the trans-
ferred property.269 Tax motivated divorce is probably not a problem for
these purposes. It seems reasonable, however, to provide for recognition of
gain where a spouse is relieved of liabilities in excess of the spouse's basis
in community property transferred to the other spouse. Such a case would
arise on divorce only where the separating couple has invested heavily in
leveraged tax shelters in which depreciation and other artificial accounting
losses have reduced basis below the indebtedness, or where the couple has
undertaken extensive post-acquisition borrowings of cash in excess of their
total basis in community assets.
Treating a release of community indebtedness as a cash payment pri-
marily affects the basis of retained property. When incurred, debt either
generates cash with a basis equal to face value270 or creates basis in an
asset acquired with a purchase money borrowing.271 A spouse's release
from an obligation to return that spouse's share of the borrowed capital
must, therefore, result in an adjustment to basis. 272 Withdrawal of cash in
the form of a release from an indebtedness can be viewed as a reduction of
the spouse's cost or after-tax investment in retained property reflected in
an adjustment to the basis of that property.27 3
Assumption of liability problems also arise where one spouse agrees to
pay the tax liability of the other. The assumption of this obligation could
produce taxable gain to the benefited spouse27 4 or be treated as part of the
amount realized by the benefited spouse on exchange of marital prop-
erty.27 5 Again the transaction is similar to a cash payment to the benefited
spouse who uses the cash to pay taxes. But under the foregoing analysis
269. I.R.C. § 357 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
270. Such cash could be used to create basis when expended in acquisition of other
assets.
271. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1946).
272. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 358(d), 1031(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For an in-depth discus-
sion of basis considerations in the divorce setting, see infra notes 307-46 and accompanying
text.
273. Under the cash analogy, release of the indebtedness is identical to the receipt of
cash, which has a basis equal to face value. The basis allocated to cash must come from a
reduction in the basis of other assets. In Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), acq.
1976-2 C.B. 1, a1 'dper curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977), Jean took property subject to
encumbrances. George was thereby relieved of his community share of this liability, in-
creasing his amount realized. 64 T.C. at 961. Under the substituted basis approach de-
scribed infra notes 315-18 and accompanying text, the husband's basis in the stock would be
reduced by the amount of his share of the encumbrances.
274. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
275. See, e.g., Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982); Johnson v. Commissioner,
495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974).
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recognition is inappropriate and would create hardship to a spouse poten-
tially lacking liquid assets with which to pay the tax. Gain or loss can be
deferred with an appropriate adjustment to the basis of property retained
by the spouse.
2 Assignment of Income
In Johnson v. Commissioner276 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a wife was taxable on collection of accounts receivable by her ex-
husband who had obtained the wife's interest in unrealized receivables in a
community property division.277 The court reasoned that under California
community property law the wife possessed a one-half interest in the
earned income represented by receivables from her husband's law prac-
tice.278 Although California law allows one spouse to transfer income to
the other, the assignment of income principles of Helvering v. Horst 279 pre-
cluded an assignment of the tax incidence of the income.280
The assignment of income doctrine is intended to avoid a transfer of
income to another by the person earning it.281 The fallacy of applying this
doctrine to a marital property division is demonstrated by the facts of the
Johnson case itself. As part of the property settlement the husband agreed
to pay the wife's tax liability for the year in which the receivables were
collected. The husband contended that the income was taxable to the wife.
Although the Ninth Circuit's opinion is obscure on this point, it seems safe
to assume that the wife was in the lower tax bracket so that taxing one-half
of the receivables to her reduced the couple's combined tax liability. Thus
the result of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Johnson resulted in a shift of
income from the higher bracket wage earner to his ex-spouse.
In different contexts the assignment of income doctrine is characterized
as a flexible concept that may yield to congressionally stated nonrecogni-
tion policies in an appropriate case. For example, the transfer of receiv-
ables to a controlled corporation as part of the transfer of a going business
will not invoke the assignment of income doctrine to require the transferor
to recognize income on the receivables.282 A similar conflict arises in a
marital property division between the judicial doctrine that income is
taxed to the person who earns it and the judicial nonrecognition rule for
community property settlements. The result in Johnson serves neither.
One-half of the earnings of a spouse in a community property state be-
276. 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943).
277. Id. at 130.
278. Id. at 129-30.
279. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
280. 135 F.2d at 128. Otherwise, a man with a rich wife would be allowed to transfer his
wife's share of earned and uncollected income to the community himself, thereby taking that
amount out of the wife's higher tax bracket and vice versa. Id.
281. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 290-91 (1946); Burnett v. Leininger, 285 U.S.
136, 142 (1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
282. Hempt Bros. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172, 1177-78 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 826 (1974); Briggs v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 440, 451 (1956).
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long to and are taxable to the nonearner spouse.283 Taxing that income to
the spouse who actually earns it, however, does not harm the basic princi-
ple of assignment of income, to wit, income is taxable to the person who
earns it.284 Assignment of income principles are not compromised where
receivables are taxed either to the spouse who produces the income or to
the nonearner spouse who may retain a one-half interest.
This analysis also applies to a division of future pension benefits. At
least one commentator has suggested that assignment of income principles
require recognition of ordinary income to the transferor of a community
property interest in a vested pension, either at the time of divorce or at the
time the pension is collected by the estranged spouse. 285 As a matter of
simplicity and sound tax policy, it makes more sense to tax the spouse who
retains these benefits at the time the pension is collected. Again, assign-
ment of income principles are not compromised where the burden of taxa-
tion falls on the person whose earnings create the income and who receives
the economic benefit.286
3. Recognition of Loss and the Related Issue of Section 1239
If, as recommended, gain is recognized in a marital property division to
the extent of an exchange of property for cash, recognition of loss must
also be considered. Under current law neither gain nor loss is recognized
in an equal division of community property.28 7 Recognized loss may be
generated in a bargain and sale case, however, where community property
is purchased from a spouse for cash or where a taxable unequal division of
community property occurs.288 Depending on timing, the loss may be sub-
ject to section 267, which disallows the deduction of loss on a sale of prop-
erty to a spouse.289
283. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 111-13 (1930); see also United States v. Mitchell, 403
U.S. 190, 194-97 (1971) (wife personally liable for federal income taxes on her one-half
interest realized during marriage, notwithstanding subsequent renunciation under state law).
284. Indeed, Bost and Kimball point out that the Johnson result creates a hardship where
the spouse transferring an interest in earned but uncollected income remains accountable for
his or her own tax liability. The more income collected by the spouse retaining the receiv-
ables, the greater the tax liability of the other spouse. Bost & Kimball, supra note 231,
§ 35.02[61, at 35-21 to -22.
285. See, Halpert, supra note 20, at 34-73. For a discussion of the problems of dividing
an interest in a qualified plan, see Haroutunian & Marks, Designating Court Orders and
Agreements for Dividing Marital Interests in Qualified Plans, 58 J. TAX'N 322 (1983).
286. The same approach may be applied to royalties and other forms of earned but un-
collected receipts divided on divorce. If these items are retained by the spouse who earned
them, or by the spouse who retains the underlying property producing the royalty, there is
no loss to the Treasury and no basis for asserting assignment of income principles. Indeed,
higher revenue may result since the recipient spouse may be in a higher bracket as a result of
the change in his or her filing status following divorce. In any event, this approach taxes the
income at the level of the person who actually earned the income, the result sought to be
achieved by forbidding anticipatory assignments of income.
287. Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959, 964 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1, afl'dper
curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977); Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718, 719 (1935).
288. Siewert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 326, 333 (1979); Rouse v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.
908, 914 (1946), afl'd, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).
289. I.R.C. § 267 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983).
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Application of section 267 depends upon marital status at the time of
transfer. In Deyoe v. Commissioner290 the Tax Court held, for purposes of
section 1239, which also applies to a transaction between the taxpayer and
his spouse,291 that a divorcing couple remain husband and wife, and there-
fore related parties, until the decree of divorce becomes final.292 Thus
whether a taxable transfer of community property occurs between related
parties in the divorce situation depends upon the date on which the sale
occurs. This is a factual inquiry focusing on the date on which the parties
intended to transfer the benefits and burdens of ownership. 293 The Deyoe
court rejected the taxpayer's argument that section 1239 is not applicable
to a sale between divorcing persons because they do not derive the benefit
that section 1239 was designed to avoid, a step up in basis within a single
economic community at capital gains rates.294
In DuPont v. Commissioner,295 however, the taxpayers successfully
avoided both sections 267 and 1239 by careful planning. The parties nego-
tiated a property settlement agreement prior to entry of the decree of di-
vorce, but the agreement was not effective under state law until approved
by the divorce court. Neither the agreement nor a bill of sale for the trans-
ferred property were delivered until after the decree of divorce. The Tax
Court observed that the parties did what they could to insure that the
property settlement agreement was "made concurrent with the divorce
rather than in consideration of it."'296
In Siewert v. Commissioner 297 the taxpayer used section 267 to his ad-
vantage. Siewert transferred cash, a note, and some community assets to
his wife in a Texas marital property settlement. The transfer, property
settlement agreement, and decree of divorce were all effective on the same
date. Rejecting Siewert's argument that the property settlement was a
nontAable division of community property with a carryover basis, the Tax
Cou-held that the community property division was a taxable exchange
and that the husband's basis in the assets equalled one-half of the commu-
nity's basis plus his cost for the one-half purchased from his wife.298 The
resulting basis figure was lower than the community's basis in Siewert's
retained assets. Siewert then asserted that the property exchange was sub-
ject to the nonrecognition rule of section 267. If the wife's realized loss
was not allowed under section 267, Siewert could claim the relief provided
by section 267(d), which allows the use of the transferor's higher basis for
290. 66 T.C. 904 (1976).
291. Section 267 bars recognition of loss on sales between related parties. Related parties
are defined to include the taxpayer's family including the taxpayer's "spouse." I.R.C.
§ 267(c)(4) (1976). Section 1239 requires recognition of ordinary gain on sale of property
that will be depreciable in the hands of a related purchaser. Related persons are defined to
include "a husband and wife." Id. § 1239(b)(1) (West Supp. 1983).
292. 66 T.C. at 913-14.
293. Id. at 910.
294. Id. at 914-15.
295. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 115 (1978).
296. Id. at 125.
297. 72 T.C. 326 (1979).
298. Id. at 337-38.
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property acquired in a transaction to which section 267 applied and which
is later sold at a gain.299 The Tax Court, agreeing, held that the property
settlement was an integral part of the divorce decree and took effect simul-
taneously with entry of the final divorce judgment.3°° The court rejected
suggestions that section 267 is not applicable to sales transactions in con-
nection with divorce, stating that section 267 contains an absolute prohibi-
tion against recognition. 30'
As asserted by the taxpayer in DuPont and the government in Siewert,
section 267 is designed to disallow a deduction for losses incurred within a
single economic unit.302 This evil does not exist in the case of a divorcing
couple since the economic unit is separated into distinct parts dealing at
arm's length. Further, divorce is an action with significant consequences
apart from taxation and is not likely to be motivated by tax avoidance.
Sophisticated tax planning, an element not universally available, can make
a large monetary difference in this area. For purposes of section 1239 the
Treasury has promulgated a regulation providing that a husband and wife
are not related parties when they are legally separated under interlocutory
decree of divorce. 30 3 Consistency demands that this same rule apply to
section 267. 304
Regardless of section 267, an independent reason for disallowing recog-
nition of loss on a marital property division of the kind found in Siewert is
that statutory nonrecognition provisions expressly disallow recognition of
loss in a transaction where boot is received, even though realized gain
would be recognized should it occur.305 Loss realized in a nonrecognition
exchange is deferred in the basis of nonrecognition property until disposi-
tion of that property in a recognition transaction. In a marital property
division the statutory nonrecognition model would bar recognition of loss
until the loss is fixed by disposition of the retained community property.
The current nonrecognition rule accomplishes this result, although current
basis rules result in a shift of tax benefits between the spouses.
299. I.R.C. § 267(d) (1976) provides that if
(1) in the case of a sale or exchange of property to the taxpayer a loss
sustained by the transferor is not allowable to the transferor as a deduction by
reason of subsection (a)(l) . . . ; and
(2) . . . the taxpayer sells or otherwise disposes of such property. . . at a
gain, then such gain shall be recognized only to the extent that it exceeds so
much of such loss as is properly allocable to the property sold or otherwise
disposed of by the taxpayer.
300. 72 T.C. at 338-40.
301. Id. at 340. Quoting McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694, 699 (1947), the
court said, "'[The predecessor of sec. 2671 states an absolute prohibition-not a presump-
tion-against the allowance of losses on any sales between the members of certain desig-
nated groups.'" 72 T.C. at 340.
302. McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694, 699-701 (1947); Hassen v. Commis-
sioner, 599 F.2d 305, 309 (9th Cir. 1979); Merritt v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 417, 419 (5th
Cir. 1968); H.R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1937), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt.
2) 704, 723.
303. Treas. Reg. § 1.1239-1(c)(1).
304. Bost & Kimball, supra note 231, § 35.02[8], at 35-25.
305. I.R.C. §§ 351(b)(2), 356(c), 103 1(c) (1976).
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Any nonrecognition rule for loss must provide an exception for the
spouse who receives only money, since there are no assets into which a loss
may be deferred. The partnership provisions of the Code contain a model
for this transaction. Section 731 (a)(2) provides that no loss shall be recog-
nized on a distribution to a partner except distributions in complete liqui-
dation of a partnership interest where no property other than money and
unrealized receivables is received.3°6 Loss is recognized to the extent of
the excess of the partner's adjusted basis in the partnership interest over
the sum of money plus the basis of unrealized receivables. A similar rule
should be applied in the divorce context. No loss will be recognized except
to a spouse who exchanges an interest in marital property for cash in an
amount less than the spouse's basis in the marital property given up. This
provision is clear and leaves little room for manipulation requiring sophis-
ticated tax planning. Only the spouse who completely cashes out his or her
investment in marital property for less than basis will be permitted to rec-
ognize a loss.
V. BASIS IN TAX-FREE DIVISIONS
A. General Provisions
Perhaps because the impact of basis determinations is not immediate,
ni)st authorities consider the role of basis in marital property divisions
only as an afterthought. Only a few cases have considered the question of
the basis of property after a marital settlement. 30 7 Under existing law, the
marital community's basis in each asset carries over to the spouse who
receives the property in a tax free division. 30 8 Thus the spouse who re-
ceives low basis property will be responsible for the tax on pre-divorce
appreciation. Conversely, the spouse receiving high basis property is bur-
dened with less future tax liability. Consequently, an equal division of
marital property by value will subsequently result in disparate impact on
the parties.
Rouse v. Commissioner309 provides the initial framework for considering
the basis of property in a nontaxable community property division. Mr.
Rouse acquired his wife's interest in community property with a cash pay-
306. Id. § 731(a)(2) provides:
[L]oss shall not be recognized to such partner, except that upon a distribution
in liquidation of a partner's interest in a partnership where no property other
than that described in subparagraph (A) or (B) is distributed to such partner,
loss shall be recognized to the extent of the excess of the adjusted basis of such
partner's interest in the partnership over the sum of-
(A) any money distributed, and
(B) the basis to the distributee, as determined under section 732 [the
partnership's basis], of any unrealized receivables . . and inventory
307. Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 471, 474 (5th Cir. 1949); Siewert v. Commissioner,
72 T.C. 326 (1979); Harrah v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 735, 748 (1978); Rouse v. Commis-
sioner, 6 T.C. 908 (1946), atd, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).
308. Harrah v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 735, 748 (1978); Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64
T.C. 959, 964 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1, a f'dper curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977).
309. 6 T.C. 908 (1946), aft'd, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).
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ment. The Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Rouse acquired his wife's interest in community property in a taxable bar-
gain and sale so that his basis for the acquired interest was his cost, the
amount paid to the wife for her interest.310 The Tax Court added in dic-
tum, however, that where each party exchanges a vested one-half interest
in the whole of the community property for an undivided interest in the
whole of one-half "there would be no resulting taxable gain, and no
change in the basis of any of the property by reason of the settlement."931
The recitation of this latter basis rule by the Tax Court without analysis is
understandable since the question of basis in a nontaxable division was not
before it. Rouse, however, has become the seminal authority on the issue,
and succeeding opinions have adopted its basis rule without further
exploration.3 12
The Rouse rule offers the advantage of simplicity. Each spouse receiv-
ing property in a nontaxable division of marital property need only know
the adjusted basis of that asset to the community. There is no adjustment
to basis and no allocation problem involved. The approach can produce
substantial inequity, however. A property division that appears equal
based on fair market values may be grossly disproportionate when the tax
consequences of subsequent disposition are considered. The superficial
simplicity of the carryover basis rule of Rouse is outweighed by the diffi-
culty of negotiating an equitable division of several assets with different
bases. The problem is particularly acute when a going business or the
stock of a closely held corporation is involved. The refusal of some state
courts to consider the future tax consequence of property division com-
pounds the difficulty.3 1 3 The party anticipating an award of low basis as-
sets is forced to agree to an unequal division of community assets in order
to avoid a court-imposed "equal" division with unfavorable tax conse-
quences. This tactic is dangerous in itself since an unequal division of
value to equalize future tax costs generates a risk that the transaction will
fail to qualify for nonrecognition treatment. One attempt at avoiding the
problem would recite in the settlement agreement that the division is ap-
proximately equal. 314 The tax system should not demand this sort of fudg-
310. 6 T.C. at 914; 159 F.2d at 707.
311. 6 T.C. at 914.
312. See, e.g., Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959, 964 (1975) (citing Wren & Oliver),
acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1, affdper curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977); Wren v. Commissioner,
24 T.C.M. (CCH) 290, 294 (1965) (relying exclusively on Rouse); Oliver v. Commissioner, 8
T.C.M. (CCH) 403, 430 (1949).(relying exclusively on Rouse). The Rouse approach to basis
follows from the analogy to a partition of jointly owned assets. When a partition of a single
asset takes place each party owning one half of the asset receives one-half of its basis. If a
community property division is not taxed because it represents merely a partition of jointly
held assets, then it is arguably inconsistent to use a carryover basis. If each spouse owns
one-half of the whole, then each spouse must also be entitled to one-half of the whole basis.
The partition should, therefore, result in a partition of basis with each spouse receiving one-
half.
313. See, e.g.,Inre Marriage of Fonstein, 17 Cal. 3d 738, 552 P.2d 1169, 131 Cal. Rptr.
873 (1976); see also Biblin, supra note 231, at 585.
314. See Bost & Kimball, supra note 231, § 35.02121, at 35-7. Fortunately the trend is
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ing in the drafting of a property settlement as the only route to an
equitable solution. Equity in taxation of marital property divisions de-
mands that an allowance be made for the tax attributes of assets ex-
changed by the parties. A provision for the division of basis would
provide such equity.
B. Basis in the Statutory Nonrecognition Exchange
The carryover basis approach of Rouse also diverges from the Code's
model for other nonrecognition transactions. Where Congress has pro-
vided for nonrecognition treatment its approach to basis looks to each in-
dividual taxpayer's investment in property.3 15 This model can be adapted
to function both equitably and practically in a nontaxable division of mar-
ital property.
The basis rules adopted for statutory nonrecognition transactions track
the taxpayer's investment in a continuing transaction in terms of the after-
tax dollars committed to the investment. Basis begins with the taxpayer's
original investment of capital, which presumably consists of after tax dol-
lars.316 Since this capital has already been included in gross income, the
taxpayer is entitled to recover basis without additional tax cost. After a
nonrecognition exchange, the taxpayer's initial investment remains com-
mitted to a continuing transaction. The basis of the property received
therefore equals the basis of the property given up. Where gain is recog-
nized because of the receipt of cash or boot, which is property in addition
to the property identified as nonrecognition property, the basis of the non-
recognition property is increased to adjust for the added tax cost of the
recognized gain.317 Cash or boot received in such a transaction must also
be allocated a basis. Thus, the basis of nonrecognition property is reduced
toward accepting a disproportionate property division as long as the disparity is not too
great. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
315. I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1), 722, 1031(d) (1976). A different description of basis having the
same effect is found in the last sentence of id. § 1033(b) and id § 1034(e). Note also that the
Code is written in terms of the taxpayer's basis in property. Each taxpayer has a basis in
property derived from cost measured in after-tax dollars. Basis is not an attribute of the
property that follows an asset from taxpayer to taxpayer. This, however, is the approach of
the Rouse rule.
316. This is based on a presumption that the taxpayer has filed tax returns properly ac-
counting for capital in the hands of the taxpayer.
317. The basis of any property, including property acquired by purchase, can be de-
scribed as the basis of the property given up in the exchange increased by gain recognized on
acquisition or decreased by recognized loss. In a transaction where gain or loss is recog-
nized, this formulation will equal the amount of money plus fair market value of property
received, the statutory definition of amount realized under I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1976). See
Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 188-89 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
If a loss is recognized in a transaction subject to statutory nonrecognition rules, the basis
rules provide for a reduction in the basis of nonrecognition property by the amount of the
loss. This adjustment accounts for the tax savings produced by the loss. A recognized loss
allows the taxpayer to receive other income free of tax cost. The receipt of this tax free
income substitutes for recovery of the capital recognized as a loss. This recovery of lost
capital requires a reduction of basis to account for a reduction of after-tax capital remaining
in the continuing investment.
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by the amount of cash and the fair market value of boot.318
This basis rule may be illustrated with a simple example. Assume that
A exchanges property with a $1000 basis for property owned by B having
a fair market value of $1200, which cost B $500. Neither A nor B recog-
nize gain on the transaction. Using the substituted basis rules of statutory
nonrecognition provisions, the basis of the asset received by A without rec-
ognition is the same as the basis of the asset given up, $1000. A's after-tax
investment in the old asset is A's tax cost for the new asset. On disposition
of this property, A is permitted to recover the $1000 basis without further
taxable gain, 319 but must include any excess over that amount in gross
income. Thus, on disposition of the new asset for $1200, A recovers the
previously taxed investment of $1000 and pays tax on $200 of recognized
gain. Similarly, B begins with an after-tax investment of $500, which be-
comes B's basis for the property received from A. On disposition of the
property for $1200 B recognizps)$700 of gain. The Treasury is satisfied
because appreciation or depreciation of both properties is accounted for on
termination of the investment by each taxpayer. A and B are also treated
fairly because deferred recognition of gain or loss is properly accounted for
upon termination of their respective investments by comparing the after-
tax dollars invested over the course of the whole transaction with the
amount realized on final disposition. It is possible, however, to construct a
model for this transaction that satisfies the Treasury but which fails to ac-
count properly for A's and B's investment.
If A receives B's asset without adjustment in the basis of that particular
asset so that B's $500 basis carries over toA, the Treasury would receive its
due on A's sale for $1200. The full $700 appreciation of B's asset is re-
ported as income. But A is dissatisfied since he recognizes a gain of $700
despite the fact that he began with an investment of $1000 and only recov-
318. Because cash is the measure of gain and loss, cash must have a basis equivalent to
its face amount. Otherwise an exchange of cash for property, a purchase, would be a taxable
event. Even when no gain is realized so that receipt of cash does not require recognition of
gain, the basis of nonrecognition property is reduced by the amount of cash. This is, in
effect, an allocation of basis to the cash in an amount equivalent to its face value. Similarly,
property received in kind other than the nonrecognition property is allocated a basis equal
to its fair market value. This accounts for the fact that gain is recognized to the extent of the
fair market value of such other property. These rules are succinctly summarized in
§ 103 1(d) of the Code, which provides:
If property was acquired on an exchange described in this section, ... then
the basis shall be the same as that of the property exchanged, decreased in the
amount of any money received by the taxpayer and increased in the amount
of gain or decreased in the amount of loss to the taxpayer that was recognized
on such exchange. If the property so acquired consisted in part of the type of
property permitted by this section .... to be received without the recognition
of gain or loss, and in part of other property, the basis provided in this subsec-
tion shall be allocated between the properties (other than money) received,
and for the purpose of the allocation there shall be assigned to such other
property an amount equivalent to its fair market value at the date of the
exchange.
I.R.C. § 1031(d) (1976).
319. Gain is computed under id. § 1001(a) by subtracting adjusted basis from amount
realized.
1984]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
ered an additional $200 on completion of the investment. If carryover ba-
sis is also adopted on B's side of the transaction, the Treasury recovers the
$200 of appreciation on A's original asset when B sells for $1200. B, how-
ever, recognizes only $200 of gain although she started with an investment
of $500 and recovered $1200, an economic accession of $700. The unfair-
ness of the latter approach, which shifts recognized income from B to A, is
obvious. Nonetheless, this is the approach adopted by the courts for deter-
mining basis in a nontaxable division of community property.
Application of the statutory nonrecognition rule to determine basis fol-
lowing a division of marital property avoids the inequity of the current
law. This approach is fairly straightforward. First, one-half of each re-
tained asset represents the spouse's initial interest in that asset. There is no
exchange with respect to this one-half. Thus, a spouse's basis in the re-
tained one-half interest in each asset will be the same as the community's
basis in that one-half interest, one-half of the basis of the whole. Second,
each spouse exchanges a one-half interest in property given to the other
spouse for that other spouse's one-half interest in retained property. Thus
the husband gives up a one-half interest in property retained by the wife in
exchange for the wife's one-half interest in property retained by the hus-
band, and the wife does the same on her side of the transaction. Each
spouse's basis for this one-half interest in property received from the other
spouse is equivalent to that spouse's basis in property given up, one-half of
the community basis of the property transferred to the other spouse.
Lastly, each spouse's basis in retained property is increased by the amount
of any gain recognized by the spouse and adjusted for any cash received to
reflect an allocation of basis to cash in an amount equal to its face value.
Thus, the husband's basis in his share of the community property is the
sum of one-half of the community basis in retained assets, plus one-half of
the community's basis in the assets received by the wife increased by gain
recognized and decreased by the amount of money received. This rule
equally divides community basis between the spouses.
Application of this proposal is easily demonstrated. Assume a marital
community with two assets each worth $50. Pursuant to a marital property
settlement, asset A is retained by the husband, asset B by the wife. Asset A
was acquired during the marriage for $40 and asset B was acquired for
$30. With respect to asset A, therefore, each party's after-tax investment is
$20, one-half of the community basis. Each party's after-tax investment in
asset B is $15. In the property division the husband retains his own $20
investment in asset A and gives up his $15 investment in asset B. Thus, the
husband's post-settlement cost for asset A in terms of after-tax dollars is
his initial $20 investment in asset A plus his lost investment in asset B, $15,
for a total after-tax cost of $35. The wife's after-tax investment is $35,
composed of her $15 initial investment in asset B plus her $20 investment
in asset A retained by the husband.
Under the Rouse rule the husband's basis in asset A is $40, the carryover
basis of asset.A to the marital community. On a sale of asset A for $50, the
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husband recognizes a $10 gain and the Treasury would obtain tax on the
full appreciation of assetA from its original cost of $40 to its sale price of
$50. The husband obtains a credit for $5 of after-tax investment that he
never made since his total investment was only $35. He obtains that credit
from the wife who, on a sale of asset B for $50, will pay tax on the $5. (See
Table III.) The wife's basis in asset B under the Rouse rule is only $30, the
community basis. Thus the wife's basis in asset B is $5 less than her tax
cost, her after-tax investment. On a sale of asset B for $50 the wife recog-
nizes $20 of gain. Again the Treasury receives a tax on the full apprecia-
tion of asset B. The wife, however, is only allowed to recover $30 of her
$35 after-tax investment. Five dollars of taxable gain has been shifted
from husband to wife. The supposedly equal division of marital property
is unequal to the extent of the added tax burden borne by the wife.
TABLE III
FMV of Cost in Rouse Increase





(assetA) 50 20 + 15 = 35 40 5
Wife
(asset B) 50 15 + 20 = 35 30 (5)
TOTAL 100 70 70 0
The basis rules for statutory nonrecognition transactions avoid the dis-
parity created by the Rouse rule. The husband's basis in asset A would be
$35, the sum of the basis of his retained one-half interest in asset A plus
the basis of property given up in exchange for the wife's interest in A,
which is the husband's one-half interest in asset B with a basis of $15. This
basis would be increased by any gain recognized and decreased by any
cash or separate property received from the wife. The husband's $35 basis
in asset A is equivalent to his after-tax cost for the property, his one-half
share of the community's original cost plus his share of the after-tax invest-
ment in asset B transferred to the wife. The wife's basis in asset B would
also be $35, her share of the initial investment in B, $15, plus her basis in
the property given up, which is her one-half of the community basis of
asset A with a basis of $20. Note that each spouse's $35 basis is equivalent
to one-half of the marital community's total basis in its community assets.
Basis is neither created nor destroyed. The Treasury again obtains tax on
the full appreciation of assets A and B on their respective sale, $15 of rec-
ognized gain by the husband on his sale of A for $50, and $15 of recog-
nized gain by the wife on her sale for $50. The burden of recognized gain
borne by each party is measured by the difference between the amount
realized by each individual, and that individual's own after-tax investment
in the property. The end result is an equal division of tax cost.
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This approach also reaches a sound result where gain is recognized be-
cause of a bargain and sale or the receipt of separate property by a spouse.
The property division in Carrieres v. Commissioner 320 serves as a complex
but instructive vehicle for analyzing this proposition.
Carrieres is one of the leading authorities on division of community
property. The case also provides an example of the difficulty encountered
in applying the Rouse basis rule to a complex transaction. Unfortunately,
the Tax Court opinion fails to grapple with the basis issue and does not
provide figures for the community basis of the Carriereses' property. We
must, therefore, use hypothetical numbers. Assume that the property divi-
sion was as follows:
TABLE IV
Asset Community FMV (net Value retained by
basis of encumbrance) Jean George
Cash $ 30,300 $ 28,300 $ 2,000
Rental property $ 20,000 55,000 27,500 27,500
Life insurance 5,000 7,400 7,400
Household furniture 5,000 3,500 3,500
Unimproved lots 10,000 23,700 25,000
Encumbrance (1,300)
Family residence 10,000 27,100 35,000
Encumbrance (7,900)
Stock 100,000 241,000 241,000
SUBTOTAL $150,000 $388,000 $117,500 $270,500
Separate cash from husband 76,500 (76,500)
TOTAL $194,000 $194,000
To equalize the property division George gave Jean an additional
$76,500 of cash from his separate property. As noted earlier, the Tax
Court held that Jean received $120,500 of property in exchange for her
interest in the stock of a family business. 3 2' Jean was required to recog-
nize gain to the extent she exchanged an interest in her community prop-
erty for George's separate property. Thus Jean recognized
$76,500/$120,500, or 63.5%, of her realized gain. If the community basis
for the stock was $100,000, Jean's basis for her one-half interest would be
$50,000. Her realized gain on the exchange would be $70,500 ($120,500-
320. 64 T.C. 959 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1, affdper curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1977).
321. Id. at 968. The $120,500 is a net figure that ignores encumbrances on real estate
received for Jean's interest in the stock. The transaction may be explained by including the
full value of the property received in amount realized and adding the cost to Jean of satisfy-
ing George's share of the liabilities to the basis of the property given up in the exchange.
The resulting realized gain would be the same under either approach. Regulations regard-
ing the role of liabilities in a like-kind exchange adopt the latter approach. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1031(d)-2 ex. 2.
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$50,000). She would recognize approximately $44,750.322
Applying the Rouse basis rule dictates that Jean received community
assets with a carryover basis of $40,000, the community basis in assets she
retained, plus cash of $104,800. Her total basis in the property received,
including the cash, is $144,800. Using our hypothetical numbers, her after-
tax investment in this property consists of: (1) her share of community
basis in retained property including one-half of the community cash,
$40,150; (2) the basis of her interest in the stock transferred to George,
$50,000; (3) the tax cost to her of $44,750 of recognized gain; and (4) the
cost of paying George's share of the community debt encumbering real
property, $4600. This total after-tax investment of $139,500 is $5300 less
than the basis she obtains under the Rouse rule. Jean will be allowed to
sell her property and receive $5300 of gain tax-free.
George's basis is more difficult to ascertain under Rouse. For the parti-
tioned real estate, he receives his one-half of the community basis. For the
stock, he is first credited with the basis of his own one-half interest,
$50,000. The Tax Court's allocation device in Carrieres suggests that
George acquired the other one-half interest in the stock for $76,500 of sep-
arate property in a taxable purchase, and $44,000 of community property
in a nontaxable property division. $44,000/$120,500, or 36.5% of Jean's
interest was therefore acquired in a tax-free division of community prop-
erty. Under Rouse, 36.5% of Jean's basis in that interest, $18,250, carries
over to George. 323 The remaining 63.5% of Jean's interest was acquired by
purchase, giving George a $76,500 cost basis. His total basis for the stock
is $144,750 ($50,000 + $18,250 + $76,500).
The approximately $5300 of tax-free basis obtained by Jean comes at
the cost of lost basis on George's side of the transaction. George's total
basis in retained property under Rouse, including cash and the partitioned
rental property, is $156,750. George's after-tax cost for this property in-
cludes his basis in the partitioned real estate of $10,000, $2000 of retained
community cash, his original basis for one-half of the stock, $50,000, his
share of the community basis of the assets retained by the wife, $15,000,
the excess community cash he transferred to the wife, $13,150, and the cost
of the settlement in the husband's separate cash of $76,500. This after-tax
investment is reduced by George's share of the community liability en-
322. The rule suggested earlier in this Article would require Jean to recognize gain to the
extent of cash in excess of her share of community cash. Jean received a total of $104,800 in
cash. Her share of the community cash was $15,150. She thus exchanged an interest in the
stock, the only community asset she relinquished, for $89,650 of cash. Since the cash ex-
ceeded her realized gain of $70,500, Jean's gain would be recognized in full. If Jean's gain is
fully recognized, the transaction is essentially a taxable sale of her community property in-
terests.
Recognition of this gain would be reflected in Jean's basis. Her basis in retained commu-
nity property, other than the partitioned real estate, would consist of her one-half share of
the community basis, $30,150, plus the basis of property transferred to George, $50,000,
George's share of indebtedness encumbering property received by Jean, $4600, increased by
her $70,500 of recognized gain, and decreased by the $89,650 of cash. Her basis in retained
property would be $65,600.
323. See Bost & Kimball, supra note 231, § 35.02[2], at 35-10.
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cumbering Jean's property, $4600, which he is no longer required to pay.
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A more equitable division of basis, reflecting the tax cost of the property
division to each party, would be achieved by employing the substituted
basis rules of statutory nonrecognition transactions. The analysis begins
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community property plus cash in exchange for his wife's interest in stock
and a release of his share of the encumbrances on real property. George
realized the fair market value of Jean's interest in the stock, $120,500, and
the release of his share of community indebtedness, $4600. He gave up his
one-half interest in the community assets retained by Jean with a basis of
$15,000. He also transferred $13,150 out of his share of community cash
and an additional $76,500 of cash that was his separate property. He
thereby realized a gain of $20,450 ($125,100-$104,650), none of which was
recognized.
Under the substituted basis proposal, George's basis in the stock equals
the basis of his retained one-half interest, $50,000, plus the basis of prop-
erty given up, $104,650. This basis is reduced to account for George's
share of the encumbrances in property taken by Jean, $4600.324 Since
George did not receive any of Jean's share of community cash nor recog-
nize any gain, there is no further adjustment to his basis. George's basis in
the retained property is shown in Table VII.
TABLE VII
George's Substituted Basis
Basis of retained community cash $ 2,000
Basis of partitioned rental property 10,000
Basis of stock:
Retained interest $ 50,000
Basis of property given in
exchange for Jean's interest
in stock
1/2 basis of assets
retained by Jean 15,000325
George's share of community
cash given to Jean 13,150
George's separate cash
given to Jean 76,500
Release of indebtedness (4,600)
150,050
Total basis $162,050
Jean's basis in her property is the sum of the basis of her retained one-
half interest in community property, her share of community basis in prop-
erty transferred to George, and the basis of future cash needed to satisfy
George's share of encumbrances on Jean's property, increased by gain rec-
324. Cf. I.R.C. §§ 358(d) (Supp. V 1981), 1031(d) (1976) (assumption of liability in tax-
free exchange treated as money received by other party in amount equal to liability or en-
cumbrance to which property is subject).
325. This figure is one-half of the sum of the community basis in property received by
Jean. See Table IV supra p. 994.
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ognized, decreased by cash received in excess of her share of community
cash. This computation is shown in Table VIII.
TABLE VIII
Jean's Substituted Basis











Basis of interest obtained from
George
Basis in property given up:
Stock $ 50,000327
Cost of satisfying George's share
of liabilities 4,600328
Increased by the gain recognized 44,750
99,350
Decreased by the cash received
George's share of community
cash $ 13,150
Separate property cash from
George 76,500
(89,650)
Total basis for allocation to
George's share of assets retained
by Jean 9,700
Basis allocated to separate and
community cash from George 89,650
Total basis for assets retained by Jean $139,500
The net result of this basis determination is that each spouse receives
one-half of the community basis with an appropriate adjustment for gain
326. This figure represents one-half of the marital community's basis in each asset.
327. This figure represents Jean's one-half share of the $100,000 community basis in the
stock.
328. Jean's basis is increased by only one-half of the community liability. The other one-
half of these encumbrances is already reflected in Jean's one-half share of the community
basis in other assets.
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recognized and additional money or property added to the pot. The total
community basis for the property was $150,000 plus community cash of
$30,300. One-half of the total is $90,150. Jean's share of this $90,150, in-
creased by her $44,750 of recognized gain and future payments of George's
$4600 share of community liabilities, is $139,500, the equivalent of the ba-
sis determined by substituting the basis of property Jean gives up, in-
creased by recognized gain, for the basis of the assets she retains. George's
$90,150 share of the community basis, increased by the additional cash he
transferred to Jean, $76,500, and decreased by his $4600 release from com-
munity liabilities, is $162,050. Again this is equivalent to the basis derived
by substituting the basis of George's interest in community property given
up, plus the separate property cash he contributed, for his basis in commu-
nity property. Thus, an equitable division of basis is constructed that ac-
counts for the tax cost to each spouse of retained property. The result is
achieved by giving each spouse one-half of the community basis for re-
tained assets plus the spouse's basis in assets given up, increased by gain
recognized, and decreased by cash received in excess of the spouse's share
of community cash and adjusted for community liabilities.
VI. ALLOCATION OF BASIS
The principal difficulty with the substituted basis approach lies in its
requirement for an allocation of basis in every case to which it is applied.
The problem of allocation is not insurmountable, however; similar issues
of allocation arise under the Rouse rule whenever gain is recognized with
respect to more than one asset, or whenever an exchange of separate prop-
erty for several community assets takes place. 329
There are three distinct elements to the substituted basis of property re-
tained by a spouse in a community property division: (1) the spouse's
basis for the retained interest in each asset; (2) the substituted basis derived
from the spouse's basis in community assets transferred to the other
spouse; and (3) basis adjustments required by the recognition of gain, re-
lease of liabilities, the receipt of excess cash, or the payment of cash or
separate property to equalize the division. The first of these elements re-
quires no allocation. Each asset retained by a spouse will keep the basis of
that spouse's community interest in the property, which is one-half of the
community basis. The second and third elements are combined into a sin-
gle figure by the substituted basis rule. The substituted basis for one-half
of the property retained is equivalent to the basis of the spouse's interest in
property given up increased by gain recognized and decreased by any cash
received, including liabilities treated as cash. This amount must be allo-
cated. Following the approach adopted in other nonrecognition situations,
329. For example, if the court had concluded in Carrieres that Jean had sold several
assets for George's cash payment, her recognized gain would be allocated among the several
assets. Likewise, had George exchanged cash for his wife's interest in several community
assets, the additional basis generated by the cash payment would require a method of allo-
cating basis to each of these assets.
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the allocation is logically based upon the relative fair market values of
assets retained by the spouse.330 This allocation reflects the proportionate
exchange of value for the retained interest in each asset.
The relative ease of the allocation process is demonstrated by the Car-
rieres setting. Jean's share of the community basis in her retained commu-
nity assets was $30,150. In addition, after allocating an appropriate
amount of her total substituted basis of $99,350 to the cash received, $9700
of basis remained to be allocated to retained property.33' Of this amount,
$4600 represents encumbrances on specific assets and may thus be allo-
cated as part of the cost of those specific properties, $650 to the unim-
proved lots, and $3950 to the residence. That leaves $5100 of substituted
basis to be allocated in proportion to value as shown in Table IX.
TABLE IX
Asset FMV 1/2 of Substituted basis Total
community from transferred basis
basis assets
Life 7,400 2,500 (5,100)(7,400/61,700)= $ 612 $ 3,112
insurance
Household 3,500 2,500 (5,100) (3,500/61,700)= 289 2,789
furniture
Unimproved 23,700 5,000 (5,100) (23,700/61,700)= 1,959
lots plus 1/2 of encumbrance 1,300 8,259
Family 27,100 5,000 (5,100) (27,100/61,700)= 2,240
residence plus 1/2 of encumbrance 3,950 11,190
Rental
property $27,500 $10,000 10,000
$5,100 $35,350
Note that the basis increase resulting from Jean's recognized gain on the
receipt of cash from George is automatically allocated to the cash by the
reduction in the basis of other property in the amount of the cash. The
reduction for cash in the substituted basis rule is simply an allocation of
basis to cash in an amount equivalent to the face value of the money.332
The same accounting occurs on George's side of the transaction. The basis
of property given up by George includes the cash transferred to Jean, an
amount equivalent to George's basis for his interest in cash. A corollary to
this rule allocates basis if gain is recognized because of an in-kind ex-
change of separate property. The separate property received by a spouse
in exchange for an interest in community property would be given a basis
equal to its fair market value to account for the gain recognized, and thus
330. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.358-2(a)(2)-(3) (allocating basis on receipt of two or more
classes of stock or securities in tax-free corporate reorganization).
331. See Table VIII supra p. 998.
332. See supra note 318.
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the tax cost of the receipt of the other spouse's separate property in a taxa-
ble exchange. 333
A. Personal Use Assets
The presence of depreciated personal use property creates an additional
difficulty under the substituted basis approach. Dividing community basis
could allow a spouse to allocate unrecoverable basis in personal use assets
to business or investment property.334 For example, in determining
George's basis in the stock (see Table VI), his one-half of the community
basis in household furniture was included in the basis of property given
up. This basis was allocated to the stock. The household furniture had a
basis greater than its fair market value. On a sale of the furniture, no loss
deduction is allowed because of the personal nature of the property.335
The basis allocated to George's stock from his interest in the household
furniture becomes recoverable, however, on a sale of the stock. Unrecov-
erable basis in a personal use asset has thus been coverted into recoverable
basis in an investment asset.336
The problem may be overstated, however, at least with respect to its
impact on revenue. Whenever an allocation of basis from personal use
assets to income producing property 337 occurs, there will be a correspond-
ing allocation of basis from the same income producing property to per-
sonal use assets on the other side of the transaction. For example, in the
Carrieres hypothetical $289 of Jean's substituted basis from the stock and
her recognized gain was allocated to the household furniture, and $2240 of
her substituted basis was allocated to the personal residence.338 In this
case substantially more basis is allocated from income producing property
to personal assets than is allocated in the other direction.
339
333. If, as recommended, the receipt of separate property in exchange for community
property is allowed without recognition of gain, see supra text following note 262, the sepa-
rate property would receive an allocation of basis in proportion to fair market value in the
same manner as the other nonrecognition property received in the exchange.
334. See Hjorth, supra note 180, at 267.
335. See I.R.C. §§ 165(c) (West Supp. 1983), 262 (1976).
336. The basis of the furniture exceeded fair market value by $1500. If the furniture
were sold for its fair market value this $1500 of basis could not be recovered with a loss
deduction. Id. § 165(c) (West Supp. 1983). George's $750 share of this unrecoverable basis
was allocated to his basis in the stock.
337. Property held for use in a trade or business or for the production of income. See,
e.g., I.R.C. § 1231 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Wood v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.
1960).
338. See Table IX supra p. 1000.
339. Note, however, that the value of personal use assets to which this basis is allocated
exceeds their respective bases, so all of the basis in the depreciated furniture would be recov-
ered on an immediate sale. That basis will be allocated in other cases from income produc-
ing property to personal property in a manner that will increase the unrecoverable basis to
the parties is equally possible. This situation would occur, for example, where one spouse
receives investment property with a basis to the community in excess of its value and the
other spouse receives personal use assets that have also declined in value below cost. Al-
though individual taxpayers may obtain some benefit from the transfer of basis from per-
sonal use assets, other will lose basis. The cost to the Treasury may tend to even out over
time.
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At the cost of added complexity in the allocation process, the problem
may be avoided by limiting the basis of personal use assets to fair market
value on the date of the property division in computing substituted basis.
The Service took this approach in Revenue Ruling 74-347.340 If this
scheme were adopted, the basis of the property given up by George in the
Carrieres hypothetical would be reduced by $750, his share of the excess of
the basis of the furniture over its value. Accordingly, George's basis in the
stock would be reduced to $161,300. If this adjustment is made, equity
also requires that none of the substituted basis resulting from a spouse's
interest in income producing property, recognized gain, or additional con-
sideration paid be allocated to depreciated personal use property in excess
of its fair market value. 341
B. Allocation to Business Assets
An additional question about the substituted basis approach arises
where assets of different character are involved in a complicated property
settlement. Where the marital property includes the assets of a sole propri-
etorship retained by one of the spouses, the other spouse's basis in business
assets will be allocated to nonbusiness assets and, conversely, the spouse
retaining the business will allocate his or her basis in nonbusiness assets to
assets retained as part of the business. Inventory and unrealized receiv-
ables present the most significant problem. Where a spouse gives up high
basis capital assets in exchange for inventory or receivables, the basis of
the capital asset allocated to inventory or receivables reduces the ordinary
income otherwise produced by such assets. Conversely, a reduction in ba-
sis in these assets, caused by an allocation of substituted basis in an
amount less than one-half of the community basis in such assets, imposes
an undue tax burden.
The problem might be resolved with a return to the Rouse rule in this
one instance to require that the community basis of receivables and inven-
tory carries over to such assets.342 The basis of these assets will be in-
creased only by recognized gain attributable to the receivables or
inventory. If a spouse's substituted basis for receivables or inventory
would be less than the community basis, basis allocated to other assets will
be reduced by the excess of the community basis in inventory and receiv-
340. 1974-2 C.B. 26; see also Hjorth, supra note 180, at 268 (example of effects of Reve-
nue Ruling).
341. This allocation would require three steps. First, a determination must be made that
an allocation of the basis of relative fair market values would result in assigning a basis to
personal use assets in excess of the fair market value of any such asset. Second, basis must
be allocated to the personal use assets to the extent of fair market value. If the spouse's basis
in his or her one-half interest in the personal use asset exceeds the value of that asset, no
additional basis would be allocated to the asset. Finally, basis remaining after allocation to
depreciated personal use assets would be allocated to other assets in proportion to fair mar-
ket value.
342. This approach is the one taken with respect to distributions of inventory and receiv-
ables to a partner in complete liquidation of the partner's partnership interest. I.R.C.
§ 732(b)-(c) (1976).
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ables over the recipient spouse's substituted basis for these assets. If a
spouse receives only inventory or receivables, the spouse's substituted basis
in excess of the community basis of the inventory or receivables may be
allocated to other property belonging to the spouse, or be allowed as a loss
on the exchange of the marital property.343
Similar characterization issues are encountered if substituted basis from
capital assets is allocated to depreciable property. Where a spouse ex-
changes personal use property or capital assets for an interest in deprecia-
ble property, either an allocation of substituted basis from the capital
assets to depreciable property occurs, or the recipient is allowed to allocate
basis to assets not involved in the exchange, hold the basis in abeyance, or
recognized a capital loss. The first of these alternatives is preferable. The
spouse is exchanging property in which he has an investment in after-tax
capital for the retained depreciable property. The investment in the prop-
erty given up is a true tax cost for the property retained. While the tax-
payer did begin with an investment in nondepreciable property and end
with depreciable property, a cost has been incurred that should be recover-
able as if that cost were a direct purchase. The taxpayer's after-tax capital
has been converted into an investment in depreciable property. The same
conversion may occur in a like-kind exchange of unimproved land for de-
preciable improved real estate, or on conversion of personal property to a
business use.344
If this reallocation of basis among assets of differing character is deemed
insurmountably difficult, a method of allocation could be used that is
analogous to the pattern of Treasury Regulation section 1.755-1, which
accounts for certain basis adjustments in the partnership area.345 Marital
assets may be divided into four categories, (1) personal use assets, (2) sec-
tion 1221 assets held for investment, (3) section 1245 and 1250 assets (de-
preciable property), and (4) inventory and receivables. The substituted
basis of property given up by a spouse in each category may be allocated
to assets of the same nature retained by the spouse. The allocation would
be in proportion to the value of assets in each category. 346 If the spouse
does not receive assets in the same category as assets given, basis may be
allocated to assets in the next category in ascending order. An alternative
closely following the Treasury Regulations would hold basis in abeyance
until the spouse acquires property of like character to which basis may be
allocated. Although this scheme would allocate basis recoverable as de-
ductions against ordinary income to similar property first, the added com-
plexity is not justified by the limited scope of the problem.
343. See id. § 731(a)(2).
344. Id. § 1031; see Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(c).
345. Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1.





The proposals in this Article may add complexity to what some consider
settled rules of easy application. The ease of application exists, however,
only because the authorities have avoided difficult basis problems created
by the current approach. The existing law is neither easy to apply nor
settled for a spouse negotiating a complex marital property division who is
faced with the inequity inherent in the current approach to marital prop-
erty divisions. The various proposals discussed in this Article lose much of
their complexity when they are read together and apart from their theoreti-
cal justification. There is value, therefore, in summarizing the proposals in
this conclusory section.
Existing rules for the treatment of spousal support would remain for
periodic and contingent payments. The recipient currently includes those
payments in gross income and the payor receives a deduction. Installment
payments of a fixed sum payable over a minimum period of time consider-
ably less than the current ten-year period, preferably over thirty-six
months, should be the subject of an election to treat payments as support
subject to sections 71 and 215. The election would require the consent of
both spouses filed with the spouse's individual tax returns for the taxable
year of divorce. If no election is filed installment payment of an ascertain-
able sum would be treated the same as a lump sum payment of cash for a
release of marital rights.
If cash payment is made to secure a release of marital rights, taxation
should depend upon the nature of the interest given up in exchange for the
principal sum. If the payments are in exchange for the inchoate marital
rights of a spouse in a common law state, as under current law, the status
nature of those rights should be recognized and the payments received tax
free without any adjustment to the income of the payor. If the payments
are in exchange for an interest in property, regardless of vesting, the cash
payment would be received in exchange for a disposition of that property
interest. Gain should be recognized to the extent a spouse receives cash in
excess of his or her basis in the marital property given up. Identification of
the spouse's vested property interest serves to identify the basis of assets
given up by the spouse. For example, a wife may have a dower or other
future interest in one-third of her husband's property for- which she re-
ceives a cash payment. She exchanges her interest in this property for cash
and recognizes a gain in the amount by which the cash exceeds the basis of
property in which she has an interest. The husband who purchases the
wife's interest in this property should obtain a basis increase to reflect his
cash cost. A spouse would share in the basis of assets subject to division on
divorce in the proportion in which the spouse may share in the value of the
marital property. In the case of an installment payment of a principal
sum, the recipient's gain could be deferred under the installment sales
rules of section 453.
One difficulty inherent in this approach lies in distinguishing between
payment for release of status rights, such as lump sum alimony, and pay-
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ment in exchange for a release of an interest in property. This requires an
investigation of varying state laws and the intent of the parties. The prin-
cipal question, answered under a federal standard, should be whether the
spouse has a right to property under state law that is extinguished with the
cash payment. Finding an exchange of cash for release of a property inter-
est is made easier if one recognizes that a divorcing couple who intend
cash payments as support can elect section 71 treatment for installment
payment of a principal sum. Under this proposal the beneficiary of sup-
port would be taxed at ordinary income rates. The seller of an interest in
property would be taxed at capital gain rates with a basis adjustment for
the purchasing spouse. In both cases the recipient of the economic benefit
of cash bears the tax burden.
In-kind division of property on divorce should be treated as a tax-free
exchange. This proposal treats the wife in a common law state who has no
vested property interest as exchanging her bundle of legal interests in the
husband's property for the property transferred to her outright. She re-
ceives a portion of the husband's estate equivalent to the value of her mari-
tal rights in the husband's existing and future assets. The common law
wife would also receive an interest in the marital community's after-tax
investment in those same assets. She shares in the basis of assets in the
husband's estate in the same proportion as the value of her marital rights
bears to the estate subject to the jurisdiction of the divorce court. This
proportionate share of basis can be used whenever it is necessary to deter-
mine gain realized on the exchange. The wife's amount realized equals the
value of property received by her for release of her property rights. The
basis of property given is her proportionate share of the basis of the estate
subject to the jurisdiction of the divorce court. The treatment of the com-
mon law wife suggested here is similar to the concept of the marital prop-
erty asserted by some commentators. It treats the wife as possessing an
interest in the marital property in the proportion assigned to her under
state law. Unlike the treatment of marriage as an equal partnership, this
proportionate approach pays homage to the distinctions between the
spouse's rights in community property and noncommunity property juris-
dictions, however ill-advised those distinctions may be in contemporary
society.
As in other nonrecognition transactions, the receipt of cash in exchange
for property should generate recognized gain to the spouse who cashes out
of an interest in property. The receipt of a spouse's proportionate share of
the marital community's cash would not be treated as an exchange of cash
for property. In addition, the receipt of cash as a substitute for future
support may go unrecognized as status gain. The husband who exchanges
property for a release of the wife's marital rights should likewise be per-
mitted to treat this as a nonrecognition exchange, thus overruling United
States v. Davis.
Identical nonrecognition treatment should be provided to divisions of
community property. No gain or loss would be recognized on a in-kind
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exchange of community property for other property pursuant to divorce.
This nonrecognition principle extends to an exchange of a spouse's sepa-
rate property for an interest in community property. There is no sound
reason to treat the in-kind receipt of separate property differently from an
exchange of community assets. Allowing the use of separate property
vastly simplifies the process of negotiating an equal property settlement.
Gain should be recognized to the extent that a spouse receives cash in
excess of the spouse's share of community cash. This principle recognizes
that the receipt of excess cash represents a termination of the spouse's in-
vestment or ownership of property and is, therefore, an appropriate occa-
sion for taxation. Similarly, gain should be recognized to a spouse
released from community indebtedness in excess of the spouse's basis in
community assets.
Consistent with basis rules applied in other nonrecognition transactions,
the basis of property received by a spouse on division of marital property
in divorce should equal the spouse's pre-divorce share of basis in the mari-
tal property received plus the spouse's basis in property given up, in-
creased by gain recognized, and decreased by cash received, including a
release of indebtedness treated as the receipt of cash. This basis rule is the
equivalent of giving each spouse his or her share of the marital commu-
nity's basis in marital property, increased by any gain recognized on the
transaction and the increased cost to a spouse who must invest additional
property in the settlement.
In a common law property division, or a community property division
where an unequal division occurs because of factors other than property
ownership, the basis given up would equal the spouse's proportionate in-
terest in the marital property as determined by the divorce court. Thus a
spouse receiving forty percent of the total estate subject to the jurisdiction
of the divorce court would be deemed to have a basis of forty percent of
the total assets and forty percent of each separate asset, subject to division
by the court. The substituted basis determined from the basis of the prop-
erty interest relinquished by a spouse is allocated first to cash received by
the spouse and then to property in proportion to value. If the basis rule is
formulated in the terms of existing statutory nonrecognition provisions, the
allocation to cash is automatic under the statutory language. If the basis
rule is formulated in somewhat simpler language giving each spouse his or
her pre-divorce share of basis, provision for allocation of basis to cash
must be included in the allocation rules.
The basis rules might also establish some standards for allocation of
substituted basis to assets of different character. The use of basis from
personal use assets might be limited to the fair market value of such assets
at the time of divorce. The basis of inventory and unrealized receivables
would remain unchanged in recognition of the ordinary income character
of such assets. Otherwise, basis should be allocated to assets in proportion
to value.
Finally, as a concession to unnecessary complexity that may be created
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by the application of these proposals to a simple property division involv-
ing few assets, the Code could provide an election to use carryover basis in
limited circumstances, applying the substituted basis rule only to parties
with substantial assets. These proposals would add a large measure of ra-
tionality and fairness to the division of property upon divorce.

